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DISSERTATION FOR THE LLM DEGREE-
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
OVERPAYMENT OF TAX: 
WHEN DOES A TAXPAYER HAVE A RIGHT TO REPAYMENT? 
PART ONE 
AN OVERVIEW 
A recent decision of the House of Lords in England, Woolwich Building Society v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners (No 2) (1 ), is of great importance for taxpayers and has impact in 
the fields of constitutional, public and tax law.Although a decision of the courts of England, it 
has great significance for our law as well, especially in the light of two important recent 
decisions of our Appellate Division, CIR v First National Industrial Bank Ltd(2) and Willis 
Faber Enthoven(Pty)Ltd v Receiver of Revenue and Another(3). 
In the Woolwich Building Society case the Revenue had issued a demand under the Income 
Tax(Building Societies) Regulations 1986 to the plaintiff building society for payment of 
composite rate tax amounting to £56 998 221 on interest and dividends paid to investors 
between 30 September 1985 and 1 March 1986 and it had paid the tax claimed under 
protest.Plaintiff disputed the validity of the 1986 regulations but paid the amount assessed in 
three instalments commencing on 16 June 1986.The next day it applied for judicial review of 
the regulations to challenge the lawfulness of certain provisions and also issued a writ on 15 
July to recover the amount paid as money had and received, together with interest thereon.In 
October 1990 the House of Lords confirmed that the sections of the regulations complained of 
were indeed ultra vires the enabling legislation(4).Plaintiff then continued its action for 
repayment and sought payment of interest on the capital from the dates of payment of the 
three instalments until judgment was given at first instance in the High Court on 31 July 
1987. 
Inland Revenue accepted only a moral obligation to repay the principal amount of £57 
million, together with interest from the date of first judgment in Plaintiffs favour.However, 
the Revenue claimed that any such repayment would be a matter of administrative grace only 
and not of legal entitlement, with the result that no interest was due for the period between 
the original payment and the date of that High Court judgment. 
Plaintiff would only have been entitled to recover the interest in issue if it would be able to 
show that it had been entitled in law to repayment of the principal sums as from the dates of 
their first payment. 
The main issue before the House of Lords was whether, and in what circumstances,a taxpayer 
is entitled, as a matter of right, to recover sums paid to the Revenue pursuant to unlawful 
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The House of Lords held, by a three-to-two majority, that money paid by a subject to a public 
authority in the form of taxes or other levies pursuant to an ultra vires demand by the 
authority was prima facie recoverable forthwith by the subject as of right at common law 
together with interest thereon, regardless of the circumstances in· which the tax was paid, since 
common justice required that any tax or duty paid by the citizen pursuant to an unlawful 
demand be repaid, unless special circumstances or some principle of policy required 
otherwise, and full effect could only be given to the fundamental principle enshrined in the 
Bill of Rights(5)that taxes should not be levied without the authority of Parliament if the 
return of taxes exacted under an unlawful demand could be enforced as a matter of right.It 
followed that when plaintiff paid the amount under the ultra vires regulations it immediately 
acquired a right to b_e repaid the amount so paid and was entitled to interest on the payments 
from the dates of the payments. 
The leading majority judgment was given by Lord Goff of Chieveley and the main issues 
raised by him were-
* that the appeal was of importance to the Revenue because it wished to maintain 
the traditional position under which the repayment of overpaid tax was essentially 
a matter for its own discretion. 
* that plaintiff had adopted a courageous and independent stance about the 
lawfulness of the underlying regulations and adopted a similar stance about the 
obligation of the Revenue to repay tax exacted without lawful authority. 
* that whereas money paid under a mistake of fact is generally recoverable, as a 
general rule money is not recoverable on the ground that it was paid under a 
mistake of law.This proposition has, however, been the subject of much criticism 
which had grown substantially during the second half of the present century.This 
topic had been dealt with by the Law Commission(6) and proposals for its 
abolition had been put forward for discussion. 
* that money paid under compulsion may be recoverable, in particular where money 
is paid as a result of actual or threatened duress to the person, or actual or 
threatened seizure of a person's goods.Money paid to a person in a public or 
quasi-public position to obtain the performance by him of a duty which he is bound to 
perform for nothing or for less than the sum demanded by him is recoverable to the 
extent that he is not entitled to it. 
* that where a sum has been paid which is not due, but it has not been paid under a 
mistake of fact or under compulsion as explained, it is generally not recoverable and 
such a payment has often been called a voluntary payment.A payment is regarded as a 
voluntary payment and so as irrecoverable where (a) the money has been paid under a 
mistake of law (b) the payer has the opportunity of contesting his liability in 
proceedings but instead gives way and pays (c) the money has otherwise been paid in 
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such circumstances that the payment was made to close the transaction. 
* that a payment may be made on such terms that it has been agreed, expressly or 
impliedly, by the recipient that, if it shall prove not to have been due, it will be repaid 
by him and in that event the money will be repayable.On the other hand, the mere fact 
that money is paid under protest will not give rise of itself to the inference of such an 
agreement, though it may form part of the evidence from which it may be inferred that 
the payee did not intend to close the transaction .. 
* that a formidable argument has been developed in recent years by leading academic 
lawyers pointing to the conclusion that money paid to a public authority pursuant to an 
ultra vires demand should be repayable without the necessity of establishing 
compulsion, on the simple ground that there was no consideration for the payment. 
* thats 33 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (which governs the repayment of 
overpaid tax by the Revenue to the taxpayer) has no application in the present case 
because the present case is not one in which an excessive assessment was made on a 
taxpayer through some error of fact or law as contemplated by the section.Rather, this 
was a case where there was no lawful basis whatever for any demand of tax to be 
made by the Revenue.In such circumstances the demand itself is ultra vires and is 
therefore a nullity.It followed that in this case there could be no valid assessment.No 
assessment was in fact raised on Plaintiff in the present case because the money 
alleged to be due by way of tax was paid, though under protest.Section 33(1) 
presupposes a lawful assessment which is excessive by reason of some error or 
mistake in a return. 
* that it is for these reasons that plaintiff is not enabled or required to seek its remedy 
through the statutory framework but must fall back on the common law.It also 
followed that the common law principles, whatever they may be, are applicable to a 
case such as the present, unconstrained by the provisions of any statute. 
* that while the vast majority of cases concerned with the recovery of tax which is not 
due will indeed be covered by statutory provisions regulating the right of recovery, the 
fact that s 33 has no application in the present case may well lead to steps being taken 
by the Revenue at an early opportunity to bring cases such as the present within its 
ambit. 
* that common justice required that any tax or duty paid by the citizen pursuantto an 
unlawful demand be repaid unless special circumstances or some principle of policy 
required otherwise; prima facie, the taxpayer should be entitled to repayment as of 
right. 
* that the retention by the state of taxes unlawfully exacted is particularly obnoxious, 
because it is one of the most fundamental principles of English law enshrined in a 
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famous constitutional document, the Bill of Rights, 1688. 
* that when the Revenue makes a demand for tax, that·demand is implicitly backed by 
the coercive powers of the state and may well entail(as in the present case) unpleasant 
economic and social consequences if the taxpayer does not pay.In any event it seems 
strange to penalise the good citizen, whose natural instinct is to trust the Revenue and 
pay taxes when they are demanded of him. 
* that there appears to be a widely held view that some limit has to be placed on the 
recovery of taxes paid pursuant to an ultra vires demand as it is possible to envisage, 
especially in modern taxation law which tends to be excessively complex, 
circumstances in which some very substantial sum of money may be held to have been 
exacted ultra vires from a very large number of taxpayers.It may well therefore be 
necessary to have recourse to other defences, such as, for example, short time limits 
within which such claims have to be advanced.The example of a general right of 
recovery subject to strict time limits imposed as a matter of policy is instructive in 
order to solve the problem in the present case. 
* that it was irrelevant in the context of the present case to consider whether the old 
rule barring recovery of money paid under mistake of law should be abolished because 
that rule can have no application where the remedy arises not from error on the part of 
the taxpayer, but from the unlawful nature of the demand by the Revenue. 
* that, in approving the 'Woolwich principle' in the present case(ie recovery of sums 
of tax overpaid pursuant to ultra vires demands) this principle should extend° to 
embrace cases in which the tax or other levy has been wrongly exacted by the public 
authority not because the demand was ultra vires but for other reasons, for example. 
because the authority has misconstrued a relevant statute or regulation.The principle of 
recovery should not be inapplicable simply because the citizen has paid the money 
under a mistake of law. 
From the points listed above the significance of the judgment may already be seen.Before 
turning to the common law and statutory provisions in South African law it is apposite to 
quote the following from Lord Goffs judgment(7): 
'The justice underlying Woolwich's submission is, I consider, plain to see.Take the present 
case.The Revenue has made an unlawful demand for tax.The taxpayer is convinced that the 
demand is unlawful, and has to decide what to do.It is faced with the Revenue, armed with 
the coercive power of the state, including what is in practice a power to charge interest which 
is penal in its effect.In addition,being a reputable society which alone among building 
societies is challenging the lawfulness of the demand, it understandably fears damage to its 
reputation if it does not pay.So it decides to pay first, asserting that it will challenge the 
lawfulness of the demand in litigation.Now, Woolwich having won that litigation.the Revenue 
asserts that it was never under any obligation to repay the money, and that it in fact repaid it 
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only as a matter of grace.There being no applicable statute to regulate the position, the 
Revenue has to maintain this position at common law ... Stated in this stark form, the 
Revenue's position appears to me, as a matter of common justke, to be unsustainable; and the 
injustice is rendered worse by the fact that it involves, as Nolan J pointed out, the Revenue 
having the benefit of a massive interest-free loan as the fruit of its unlawful action.'.N 
Jordan and J Peacock, commenting on this .case in a recent edition of the Tax Joumal(8), 
conclude their remarks in this way: 
'The precise effects of the judgments in the second Woolwich case will no doubt be analyzed 
at length by academic writers in the coming months.The reaction to it on the part of 
Whitehall, and particularly the Treasury, will be awaited with great interest.Specifically, 
lawyers will want to see how the Government reacts to the wider form of the principle 
(expressed to be obiter) under which recovery can be made of excessive sums (tax and 
non-tax) paid in response to intra vires demands.This is something the Government may feel 
that it has to override or limit in some way so as, in the magic phrase, 'to protect the security 
of public finances'.In our view further legislative action of some sort is now likely.' 
Turning now to South African law, the first case to be considered is CIR v First National 
Industrial Bank Ltd(9) where the facts were that respondent had paid stamp duty on autocard 
transactions to appellant under protest, since it had contended that the duty was not 
payable.Each payment had been accompanied by a letterstating that payment had been made 
under protest. 
Appellant had insisted that respondent bank was liable for the payment of stamp duty in terms 
of s 3 of the Stamp Duties Act 77 of 1968 in respect of transactions with its customers on its 
autocard machines. 
The bank had contended that its autocard scheme did not attract stamp duty but, after an 
unfavourable ruling from the Registrar of Financial Institutions, arid fearfuLof the possibility 
that penalties could be levied against it if it failed to pay the amounts demanded by appellant 
timeously, it made a series of payments.Each payment was accompanied by a letter stating: 
'As we have not yet finalized this matter with the authorities, in order to avoid any penalty .... , 
we hereby make payment, under protest, of stamp duty in respect of the .... debit entries to our 
Auto Card holders.' 
In due course the bank claimed repayment of the sum of R488 353, 80 plus interest.Appellant 
refused the demand and action was instituted against him. 
The court a quo found for the bank, ordering the repayment of the capital sum and payment 
of interest. 
Two issues were debated before the court a quo.Firstly, whether stamp duty was properly 
chargeable and accordingly whether the Commissioner was obliged to repay the capital sums 
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paid to his office.Secondly, if so, whether the Commissioner was bound, in addition, to pay 
interest on the capital sums that had to be repaid,from the respective dates on which each 
payment had been made by respondent to the Commissioner. . 
Appellant accepted the decision of the court a quo on the first but not on the second issue, 
hence the appeal to the Appellate Division, brought with leave of the court a quo. 
The issue before the Appellate Division was, therefore, the nature of the claim for repayment 
for on this depended the bank's right to claim interest a tempore morae and whether, and if so 
from which date, the Commissioner was obliged to pay 'interest a tempore morae' on stamp 
duties he collected when he should not have done so and which were paid to him 'under 
protest'. 
When respondent had initially applied for a refund it did so in terms of s 32(l)(a) of the 
Stamp Duties Act 77 of 1968. 
The section read at the relevant time: 
'I .The Commissioner may make, or authorise to be made, a refund in respect of: 
(a) the amount of any overpayment of the duty or any penalty properly chargeable in respect 
of any instrument, if application for the refund is made within two years after the date of such 
overpayment.' 
The court a quo had held thats 32(l)(a) was not applicable to respondent's claim for a refund 
and that the legal relationship between appellant and respondent was what the court described 
as an 'ordinary common law legal relationship flowing from unjust enrichment'.Also, 
according to the court a quo, respondent was entitled to interest at the legal rate in respect of 
each payment from the moment such payment was received by appellant. 
The Commissioner contended in the Appellate Division that s 32(1 )(a) not only applied but 
that 'it is the only possible legal and factual basis' for a refund and since the section did not 
expressly provide for interest, no interest was recoverable.The Commissioner also contended 
that the condictio indebiti could not lie against him since he was merely the officer 
responsible for carrying out the provisions of the Stamp Duties Act 77 of 1968 and no cause 
of action based on unjustified enrichment could lie against such an officer in respect of funds 
channelled into the Consolidated Revenue Fund and the fiscus was not liable to pay mora 
interest. 
Respondent contended that its true claim was either the condictio indebiti or one under 
contract and that its initial reliance on s 32(1)(a) did not prejudice its claim under either head. 
Nienaber AJA(with whom Corbett CJ, Botha JA and Kumleben JA concurred, Nicholas AJA 
dissenting) held that the claim could not be one based on statute as the relevant section of the 
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Stamp Duties Act referred to refunds for 'overpayments', which this was not and therefore had 
to be either a condictio indebiti or a claim based on a contract between the parties, to the 
effect that if the amount paid was not in fact owing it would be refunded. 
Nienaber AJA rejected the first possibility and found that the claim was based on an 
agreement to repay the sum paid under protest by the bank.The consequence of this finding, 
he held, was that appellant's failure to pay when demand was made did not amount to mora 
since it was only when the claim was adjudicated, and the court had found that the stamp 
duty paid by the bank had not been owing, that an obligation to repay arose.No liability to 
pay interest a tempore morae had thus been incurred by appellant. 
It had been argued for the bank that the condictio indebiti did lie for the recovery of money 
paid under protest- duress.The court accepted that in modern law the condictio can be used 
where the plaintiff has paid a sum of money involuntarily and that it can be granted against 
the fiscus.Nienaber AJA relied, in this regard, on Union 
Government(Minister of Finance) v Gowar(lO) in which Innes CJ said: 
'Where goods have been wrongly detained and where the owner has been driven to pay 
money in order to obtain possession, and where he has done so not voluntarily, ... but with an 
expressed reservation of his legal rights, payments so made can be recovered back, as having 
been exacted under duress of goods.The onus of showing that the payment had been made 
involuntarily and that there had been no abandonment of rights would, of course, be upon the 
person seeking to recover.' 
Nienaber AJA was, however, of the view that in this case the payments had not been made 
involuntarily and that there had not been 'duress of goods'.He concluded that the bank had not 
been forced to pay- it had decided to do so in order to avoid the possible imposition of 
penalties.Further, there was no evidence that appellant had ever threatened to impose penalties 
if payment was not made timeously.The bank had also not requested a suspension of payment 
or a remission of penalties until the dispute was resolved. 
Accordingly Nienaber AJA was of the view that it could not be said that improper pressure 
had been exerted on the bank to effect the payment timeously and in terms of the statute.The 
payments had been voluntarily made.The fact that the bank had made the payments expressly 
'under protest' did not affect this finding.The court was, however, of the view that these 
words had served as a basis for an agreement between the parties that repayment would be 
effected by appellant should the issue be resolved in favour of the bank, and a new and 
independent cause of action had emerged from the agreement. 
Nicholas AJA in his dissenting judgment examined the Roman origins of the condictio 
indebiti and found that the facts of the case fitted the principle(! I): 
'If a man pays on the understanding that if it should not prove to be due, .. the money should 
be returned, an action for the return will be in place, as there isa contract concluded between 
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the parties .. .' 
Nicholas AJA also relied on the judgment of De Villiers AJA in the Union Government 
case(12) in which, after a review of the Roman-Dutch authorities, De Villiers AJA had said: 
· [l]f a person pays a debt not due knowingly and voluntarily, he is not able to recover.But if 
he pays under protest he is entitled to recover, for the protest is inconsistent with the idea of a 
gift or a compromise between the parties.The other party was not bound to accept money so 
paid, but if he accepts it he must be considered to have agreed that it should be recoverable if 
not due ... ' 
Nicholas AJA was of the view that the bank had, by making known its protest at payment, 
reserved its right to institute an action for recovery- condicere- and that the condictio indebiti 
was the appropriate action in the circumstances. 
He reaffirmed the principle that interest is not payable under the condictio indebiti itself but 
held that appellant had been in mora on failure to discharge his obligation on demand, and 
was therefore liable for the payment of interest a tempore morae, that is, the date on which 
the bank had claimed a refund. 
Carole Lewis(13) has commented in this way on the judgments in the First National Industrial 
Bank case: 
'The dissenting judgment is, with respect, to be preferred.Surely it is not logical to suggest 
that a payment is made voluntarily simply because one is not coerced into making the 
payment with force, or the threat of it against one's person or one's property? Is it necessary 
for the person making payment to exhaust all avenues to discover whether it is indeed due-
including taking the matter to court before he makes payment- in order for it to be 
'involuntary' ? And surely the right of the commissioner to levy heavy penalties for late 
payment is sufficient: must he threaten to exercise the right in order for the bank to act under 
duress? I would think not.The pressure felt by the bank was not, in my view, 'the phantom of 
their own minds' ... One does not take risks with the fiscus. 
Moreover, the equities favour the payment of interest to the bank, which had been out of 
pocket for some considerable time, despite the fact that it had rightfully protested about the 
payment of the duty in question.' 
The following points should be borne in mind from the First National Industrial Bank case-
* s 32(1 )(a) of the Stamp Duties Act 77 of 1968 contemplated a payment made in 
respect of duties rightly chargeable but wrongly calculated- to the extent of any 
excess there would be an 'overpayment' and it would be an overpayment of duties 
'properly chargeable'. 
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* in the instant case the payments were made by the bank and accepted by the 
Commissioner in respect of· an instrument' which did not, in reality, attract duty at 
all; consequently this was not a case where respondent paid in excess of what it 
should have paid; this was a case where it should not have paid anything at 
all.Hence there was no overpayment of duties · properly chargeable' and s 32(1 )(a) 
accordingly did not apply. 
* s 32(l)(a) was not the sole and exclusive vehicle for claiming repayment in a 
case such as the present and the section did not, either in terms or context, purport 
to create a comprehensive remedy and hence the section was not conclusive of the 
entire issue- the fact that the section was silent on the question of interest did not 
mean that no interest was payable at all. 
* what s 32(1 )(a) did was to empower the Commissioner, in particular circumstances, 
to make or approve a refund- but that did not mean that an aggrieved party was 
precluded from advancing a claim for repayment on a different basis, or that_ the 
section precluded a claim for mora interest where the overpayment was legally 
recoverable at common law. 
* that the condictio indebiti did lie in general against the Commissioner as he was 
the authority to whom payment had to be made and, once the other requirements 
of the condictio indebiti had been satisfied, he was the obvious party from whom 
payment had to be recovered, whatever the ultimate administrative destination of 
the payments might be. 
* that in our law the fiscus could be held liable for mora interest. 
* where, as in this case, a public official demands payment in terms of a statutory 
provision, and payment is thereupon effected · under protest' because the liability( or 
the sum) is disputed, it is more likely than not that it was tacitly understood between 
the parties that the sum so paid would be refunded if the official view should 
subsequently prove to be the wrong one. 
* there was no principle of law which entitled one party to demand interest at the 
legal rate from another simply because the former had been deprived of the 
benefits and fruits of the money which he had paid to the latter. 
The second South African case to be considered is Willis Faber Enthoven(Pty)Ltd v Receiver 
of Revenue and Another (14) in which the Appellate Division modified in an important 
respect the requirements of the condictio indebiti with significant resulting implications for 
tax law. 
The facts were that Willis Faber Enthoven(Pty )Ltd, a company formed at the end of 1985 by 
the merger of two separate companies trading as insurance brokers, instituted action for the 
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recovery of certain payments, mistakenly made by the two companies prior to the merger, to 
the Receiver of Revenue. 
These payments were made in the following circumstances: Section 60(1 )(f) of the Insurance 
Act 27 of 1943 stipulates that anyone carrying on insurance business of a specified kind must 
pay a tax of 2 1/2 per cent of the aggregate of all premiums paid during the preceding 
calendar year on policies which were effected through his agency in terms of this 
section.From a reading of s 60 as a whole it was quite clear that insurance business 
'underwritten by underwriters at Lloyds'('Lloyds business') fell within the purview of the tax 
clause.Less certain, however, was whether business placed outside the Lloyd's market, but 
effected or renewed through a broker at Lloyds(' other business') was also targeted by s 
60(l)(f).The problem was that the words 'this section' in s 60(l)(f) could be read to refer 
either to s 60(1) only(in which case Lloyds business only would have been meant), or to the 
entire s 60(ie including s 60(2)) which would have had the effect that other business would 
have fallen within the ambit of the clause as well. 
When the one-time financial manager of Robert Enthoven & Co(one of the pre-1985 
companies) took up his post at that company he found a directive from the Registrar of 
Insurance which stated that the tax must be paid on both Lloyds and otherbusiness.He had 
misgivings and telephoned the Registrar's office to check that the tax was indeed payable on 
other business.The assistant registrar to whom he spoke merely referred him to the 
abovementioned directive.He then accepted the position as stated in the directive as 
authoritative and went on paying the tax.After the merger the matter was taken up again and 
this resulted in the present action. 
The first question that arose in the appeal was whether the tax imposed in terms of s 60(1 )(f) 
was payable, not only in respect of policies underwritten by underwriters at Lloyds but also in 
respect of policies not so underwritten but effected or renewed through a broker at Lloyds in 
terms of ss (2). 
Appellant had instituted action in the Transvaal Provincial Division to recover payments of 
tax made by it to the Receiver of Revenue in respect of policies not underwritten at Lloyds 
averring that the said payments had been made under the bona fide and reasonable but 
mistaken belief that the said amo.unts were due and payable to the Receiver whereas in law 
and in fact the said moneys were not due nor payable to him at all and in the premises the 
Receiver had been unjustly enriched at the expense of appellant in the amount of R209 627, 
15. 
The matter came to trial before Spoelstra J in the court a quo on the issues of whether the 
payments in question were due in terms of s 60( 1 )(f) and, if not, whether appellant was 
entitled to recover them. 
The Receiver contended that the mistake on which appellant relied was one of law and that 
this entailed that the payments were not recoverable. 
IO 
Spoelstra J had decided the first issue in appellant's favour but upheld the Receiver's argument 
on the second issue and dismissed the claim.Subsequently he granted appellant leave to 
appeal. 
Before the Appellate Division the Receiver of Revenue claimed that the tax imposed in terms 
of s 60(l)(f) was payable in respect of both types of business.He also contended that the 
mistake on which appellant relied was one of law and this meant that the payments were not 
recoverable. 
The second question to be decided by the Appellate Division was whether appellant was 
entitled to recover the taxes paid in error.What remained for the court to consider was, firstly, 
whether a mistake of law was indeed as a rule a bar to the condictio indebiti and, if not, 
secondly, whether appellant was in the circumstances of the case entitled to recover the 
amounts paid. 
Finally, the court had to examine the excusability of the error in the present case and in this 
regard the information presented to the trial court about the circumstances in which the tax 
had been paid took the form of a statement of agreed facts and the evidence of a single 
witness, being the financial manager of Robert Enthoven at the relevant time. 
Hefer JA(with whom Joubert JA, Nienaber JA and Kriegler AJA concurred, Van den Heever 
JA dissenting) came to the following conclusions-
* on the correct interpretation of s 60(l)(f) the tax imposed by para (f) was not 
payable on policies not underwritten by underwriters at Lloyds but effected or 
renewed through a broker at Lloyds in terms of s 60(2). 
* in any event, s 60(1)(f) was, at least, reasonably capable of such a construction 
and, being one in which a burden is imposed, it must be construed in the way more 
favourable to the subject. 
* South African law is to be adapted in such a manner as to allow no distinction to 
be drawn in the application of the condictio indebiti between mistake of law (error 
juris) and mistake of fact(error facti). 
* it followed that an indebitum paid as a result of a mistake of law can be 
recovered, provided that the mistake is found to be excusable in the circumstances 
of the particular case. 
* it was not possible nor would it be prudent to define the circumstances in which 
an error of law can be said to be excusable or, conversely, to supply a compendium of 
instances where it is not. 
* all that needs to be said is that, if the payer's conduct is so slack that he does not 
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in the court's view deserve the protection of the law, he should, as a matter of poliey, 
not receive it; there can obviously be no rules of thumb and conduct regarded as 
inexcusably slack in one case need not necessarily be so.regarded in others and vice 
versa. 
* much will depend on the relationship between the parties, on the conduct of the 
defendant who may or may not have been aware that there was no debitum and whose 
conduct may or may not have contributed to the plaintiff's decision to pay and on the 
plaintiff's state of mind and the culpability of his ignorance in making the payment. 
* the onus, in a condictio indebiti, lies on the plaintiff to prove every element 
constituting his cause of action and this includes the excusability of the error in 
making the payment. 
* there is nothing unfair in, and there is no consideration of policy or practice 
militating against, expecting of a plaintiff who alleges that he paid an amount of 
money in mistake of law to prove sufficient facts to justify a finding that his error was 
excusable. 
* on the facts, the error on the part of Robert Enthoven was excusable in that it could 
not be blamed for turning to, or for accepting the ruling of, the official to whom the 
administration of the Act had been entrusted and to whom members of the public 
would naturally turn for guidance. 
* there was insufficient information before the court to justify a finding that the 
mistake was excusable on the part of Willis Faber- its position being not as clear since 
there was no direct evidence of the circumstances in which it paid the tax. 
* appellant was entitled to recover the amount unduly paid by Robert Enthoven only, 
being an amount of Rl 65 278 according to the statement of agreed facts. 
Van den Reever JA, in her dissenting judgment, said(l 5): 
'We are not dealing with a situation where the mistake relied on is one affecting only the 
rights of individual immediate parties to a relationship.What is in issue is the interpretation of 
a statute. One of the parties is the State, not in a one-to-one- say, for example, contractual-
relationship with appellant, but the State in its more customary, authoritarian guise applying a 
general law.The matter accordingly has a far more general dimension and affects both the 
State itself and large numbers of others who arrange or have arranged their affairs on a 
certain view of that law. 
The citizen in his relationship with the State, though no longer expected to be legally 
omniscient, has a duty to acquaint himself with the various laws or regulations applicable to 
the particular occupation in which he engages ... 
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Although the test applied in the criminal law in assessing the culpability of a citizen's 
ignorance has refinements not relevant to the present matter, the cases following on R v De 
Blom 1977(3)SA 513(A) are instructive.The duty to take reasonable steps to discover the law 
is a real one.Mere casual enquiry will not suffice to excuse ignorance ... The interests of the 
community as a whole require there to be certainty as to the law.I can think of no reason why 
the citizen shouldhave a more onerous duty when his liberty is at stake than when it is merely 
his money that matters.' 
In a most unusual case, CIR v Bowman NO(l 6), the facts were that for the years 1977 to 
1982 the taxpayer rendered returns reflecting taxable income despite its knowledge that such 
returns were fictitious.The company was well aware that in none of the tax years in question 
did it make any taxable income whatsoever. · 
The company was assessed to tax on these returns and the amounts so assessed were paid. 
Upon liquidation of the company the liquidator of the taxpayer company, relying on s 26(1) 
of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 sought to recover the aggregate value of the tax paid in the 
years in question on the ground that the payments constituted a disposition of property not 
made for value. 
It was argued on behalf of the Commissioner in the Appellate Division that (i) having regard 
to the provisions of the Income Tax Act 58 of l 962 the company did receive value for its 
payments, ie its release from the lawful obligation to pay to appellant the amounts assessed 
by him (ii) the provisions of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 are such as to make assessments 
of income tax final and conclusive, not only as against the taxpayer but also, on insolvency, 
as against a liquidator or trustee and (iii) the only manner in which an assessment can be 
questioned is by way of objection under s 81 and appeal under s 83 of the Income Tax 
Act.Goldstone AJA(as he then was) (with whom Corbett CJ, Smalberger AJ, Milne AJ and 
Friedman AJA concurred) held that the payments of tax in question constituted dispositions of 
property not made for value in terms of s 26(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 as 'no 
benefit or value is or has been received or promised as a quid pro quo.'Moreover, the 
payments of tax were made in circumstances where there was no underlying obligation to pay 
any amounts at all to the appellant; there was no income earned by the company and therefore 
no normal tax was assessable or payable under the lncome Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
Goldstone AJA observed that if a lawful obligation to pay the money in fact existed, then the 
obvious benefit which the taxpayer received in return for such payment was a discharge from 
his liability to pay.Such a payment decreases his assets but at the same time it diminishes his 
liabilities and in transactions which are entered into in the ordinary course of business such a 
discharge from a liability would be value for the payment made. 
It was further held in the Bowman case-
* that an assessment to which no objection has been made becomes final and 
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conclusive as between the Commissioner and the taxpayer and persons privy to the 
taxpayer, eg his executor- being the effect of s 81 (5) of the Income Tax Act. 
* that the liquidator of a company is not privy to the company in liquidation- being a 
third party- and, consequently, assessments of income tax on the company are not final 
and conclusive on insolvency against the liquidator or trustee. 
* that there was nothing in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 which, in any way, 
was inconsistent with the provisions of s 26(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 
and there was consequently no basis upon which the Insolvency Act could be said 
to have been overridden by the Income Tax Act. 
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THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Statutory provisions governing the repayment of overpaid tax by the Revenue 
Taxes Management Act 1970 
s 33 
'(1) If any person who has paid tax charged under an assessment alleges that the assessment was 
excessive by reason of some error or mistake in a return, he may by notice in writing at any time 
not later than six years after the end of the year of assessment(or, if the assessment is to 
corporation tax, the end of the accounting period) in which the assessment was made, make a 
claim to the Board for relief. 
(2) On receiving the claim the Board shall inquire into the matter and shall, subject to the 
provisions of this section, give by way of repayment such relief inrespect of the error or mistake 
as is reasonable and just: Provided that no relief shall be given under this section in respect of 
an error or mistake as to the basis on which the liability of the claimant ought to have been 
computed where the return was in fact made on the basis or in accordance with the practice 
generally prevailing at the time when the return was made.' 
Section 33 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 makes provision for the recovery of overpaid 
Income Tax, Corporation Tax, Capital Gains Tax and Petroleum Revenue Tax where there is an 
excessive assessment by reason of 'error or mistake' in any tax return.Thus, it is not a general 
right to recover tax not due, but depends'on proof of 'error or mistake'.It applies to errors and 
mistakes both of fact and law but is limited in that no relief is to be given 'in respect of an error 
or mistake as to the basis on which the liability .... ought to have been computed where the return 
was in fact made on the basis or in accordance with the practice generally prevailing at the time 
when the return was made.'(l)This important limitation is designed to preclude recovery where 
many persons are affected by the same error and a right to recover might thus disrupt the conduct 
of R,evenue business or even of government finances. 
Applications for relief are made to the Board of Inland Revenue which is required to give such 
relief as is 'reasonable and just.'(2) 
The Board is directed by s 33(3) to 'have regard to all the relevant circumstances ... and in 
particular ... whether the granting of relief would result in the exclusion from charge to tax of any 
part of the profits of the claimant, and for this purpose the Board may take into consideration the 
liability of the claimant and assessments made on him in respect of chargeable periods other than 
that to which the claim relates.This is designed to ensure that the taxpayer does not gain a 
windfall benefit from recovery. 
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The question of what relief is 'reasonable and just' is a matter for the Board itself to decide 
subjecdi tiisel:fpealdecUie Special Commissioners. 
There is no general right to require a case to be stated on a point of law where relief is sought 
under the section, which includes the question of what constitutes reasonable and just 
relief.Although it is possible that a court could determine this question on an application for 
judicial review for error of law. 
It appears that relief is normally given and the section is regarded as affording a prima facie right 
to relief where it applies. 
Value Added Tax 
Section 24 of the Finance Act 1989 provides that 'where a person has paid an amount to the 
[Customs and Excise] Commissioners by way of value added tax which was not tax due to them, 
they shall be liable to repay the amount to him'(3) on a claim being made for the purpose.(4) 
This provision gives a general right to recover a tax not due which does not depend on the 
circumstances of payment.It is irrelevant, for example, whether the payment was made under a 
mistake. 
The limitation period is six years from the date on which the payment was made.But where the 
payment is made by reason of mistake a claim may be brought at any time within the expiry of 
six years from the time the claimant discovered the mistake, or co_uld with reasonable diligence 
have discovered it.There appears to be no legal right to interest on the amount repaid. 
It is a defence to any claim under the section that repayment 'would unjustly enrich' the 
claimant(5). 
The section specifically states that there is to be no liability to repay by virtue of the fact that 
it was not tax due except under the section(6). 
Excise Duty and Car Tax 
Section 29 of the Finance Act 1989 governs the recovery of overpaid excise duty and car tax.It 
provides that proceedings for restitution of such amounts 'shall not be dismissed by reason only 
of the fact that the amount was paid by reason of a mistake of law'(7).The intention appears to 
be that such payments made under a mistake of law should be recoverable on the same basis as 
payments made under a mistake of fact.In contrast with s 24 concerning VAT, s 29 only applies 
to mistaken payments and does not apply to all cases where the payment is not lawfully due. 
In the case of car tax it appears that interest should be payable on any sum repaid but it is not 
so clear whether it would be legally payable in respect of overpaid excise duty. 
The section specifically provides that the defence of' unjust enrichment' shall be available(8) as 
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it is under s 24. 
Inheritance Tax 
Limited provision is made for the recovery of overpaid Inheritance Tax in s 241 of the 
Inheritance Tax Act 1984.Section 241 (1) provides that where it has been proved to the Board that 
too much tax has been paid the Board is required to repay the excess.This right of recovery is 
not dependent on proof of any error by the payer. 
The provision is, however, limited in a similar way to s 33 of the Taxes Management Act 
l 970.Section 255 of the Inheritance Tax Act provides effectively that there shall be no recovery 
where the payment is made and accepted 'on a view of the law then generally received or 
adopted in practice'(9). 
Interest is payable on the amount returned(} 0). 
There is no obligation to repay where the claim for repayment is made more than six years after 
the payment of the tax in respect of which recovery is sought(l 1 ). 
Stamp Duty 
Section 13(4) of the Stamp Act 1891 confers a right to the recovery of Stamp Duty which has 
been paid in conformity with an erroneous assessment.The right does not depend on any error 
by the payer.The court is empowered to award interest on the amount recovered. 
Social Security Contributions 
There is a provision in the Social Security(Contributions) Regulations 1979 which gives a right 
to the recovery of National Insurance Contributions paid in error.This provision applies whether 
the mistake is one of fact or law. 
Community Charge and Non-Domestic Rates 
With respect to the Community Charge and non-domestic rates general provision has been made 
in regulations for the recovery of overpayment.These provisions apply where there has been an 
overpayment following an excess demand in a notice issued by the charging authority and so do 
not depend on proof of a mistake by the payer. 
Import Duties 
The recovery of import duties not lawfully payable is governed by s 127 of the Customs and 
Excise Management Act 1979.The dispute must arise before the delivery of the goods ands 127 
simply provides for a method of challenge, as an alternative to that of withholding payment, 
which is not permitted.The importer must pay the amount demanded but may then require the 
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matter to be referred to the High Court or, where the issue concerns the valuation of goods, to 
a referee.If on such a reference it is determined that there has been an overpayment, the amount 
overpaid shall be repaid together with interest.An application to the High Court or a referee must 
be made within three months of the date of the payment.With respect to matters not covered by 
s 127, there is no right to recover except in so far as provided by the common law.However, an 
express discretion to repay is given to the Commissioners by the section. 
Relatioi;iship between statutory provisions and the common law 
In Woolwich Equitable Building Society v IRC(l2) Butler-Sloss LJ stated that significantly the 
legislative structure which governs taxation only provided for repayment of overpayment under 
intra vires regulations.He said: 
'No structure is in place to deal with the demand for and payment of tax which has been 
unlawfully demanded under legislation found to be ultra vires.To deal with that eventuality the 
courts are thrown back upon the common law and precedent.' 
The comment has been made(l3): 
'The argument that the legislative structure only deals with overpayment under intra vires 
regulations does not address the position of overpayment made directly under a statute where no 
regulations have been made.It is surely arguable that the statutory remedy applies whenever there 
has been payment of a sum which, under the statute, is not due, although such payment in a 
sense is ultra vires.If so a somewhat unsatisfactory distinction would exist between payments by 
reason of an unauthorised demand not backed by regulations and payments by reason of an 
unauthorised demand contained in regulations.Furthermore, it does not explain why statutory 
rights of recovery covering payments 'by reason of a mistake', where tax was 'not tax due' or, 
where 'a lesser or no amount was properly payable' are not appropriate to cover all relevant 
payments, whether intra vires or ultravires.' 
However, the reference in the Taxes Management Act 1970, s 33, to an 'assessment' which 'was 
excessive by reason of some error or mistake' could possibly be seen as confined to an 
assessment which, other than bejng excessive by reason of an error or mistake in the return, is 
for all other purposes final and conclusive and accordingly intra vires(l4). 
In Woolwich Building Society v IRC(No 2)(15) Lord Keith of Kinkel said: 
'To give effect to Woolwich's proposition would, in my opinion, amount to a very far reaching 
exercise of judicial legislation.That would be particularly inappropriate having regard to the 
considerable number of instances which exist of Parliament having legislated in various fields to 
define the circumstances under which payments of tax not lawfully due may be recovered, and 
also in what situations and on what terms interest on overpayment of tax may be paid.Particular 
instances are s 33 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 as regards overpaid income tax, 
corporation tax, capital gains tax and petroleum revenue tax; s 24 of the Finance Act 1989 as 
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regards value added tax; s 29 of the Finance Act 1989 as regards excise duty and car tax; s 241 
of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 as regards inheritance tax; ands 13(4) of the Stamp Act 1891 
as regards stamp duty.' 
He continued(l6): 
'It seems to me that formulation of the precise grounds on which overpayment of tax ought to 
be recoverable and of any exceptions to the right of recovery, may involve nice considerations 
of policy which are properly the province of Parliament and are not suitable for consideration by 
the courts.In this connection the question of possible disruption of public finances must obviously 
be a very material one.Then it is noticeable that existing legislation is restrictive of the extent to 
which interest on overpaid tax( described as 'repayment supplement') maybe recovered.A general 
right of recovery of overpaid tax could not incorporate any such restriction.I would add that 
although in the course of argument some distinction was sought to be drawn between 
overpayment of tax under regulations later shown to be ultra vires and overpayment due to the 
erroneous interpretation of a statute, no such distinction can, in my view, properly be drawn.' 
In contrast, Lord Goff of Chieveley said(l 7): 
· .. .it is first necessary to have regard to the impact of any relevant statutory provisions governing 
the repayment of overpaid tax by the Revenue to the taxpayer.Statutory regulation of such 
repayments is a commonplace of our law, not only in the case of overpaid income and 
corporation tax, but also in the case of other taxes (such as value added tax, capital gains tax and 
inheritance tax) and other duties and charges .. 
However, there is, in my opinion, a more fundamental reason why the section [ s 33 of the Taxes 
Management Act 1970) has no application in the present case.This is because the present case 
is not one in which an excessive assessment was made on a taxpayer, through some error of fact 
or law, as is contemplated by s 33(1).This is a case where there is no lawful basis whatever for 
any demand of tax to be made by the Revenue.In such circumstances, the demand itself is ultra 
vires and is therefore a nullity.It follows that in a case such as the present there can be no valid 
assessment.No assessment was in fact raised on Woolwich in the present case, because the money 
alleged to be due by way of tax was paid, though under protest .. .If the assessment is alleged to 
have been made (as here) under ultra vires regulations, the proper course is to take proceedings 
by way of judicial review to quash the aberrant regulations and the assessment made thereunder, 
not by way of an appeal under procedure which presupposes that the assessment, although it may 
be erroneous, is basically lawful.Just as the appeal procedure presupposes a lawful assessment, 
so does s 33(1) of the Taxes Management Act 1970, which is concerned with a lawful assessment 
which is excessive by reason of some error or mistake in a return .. .It is for these reasons that 
Woolwich is not enabled or required to seek its remedy through the statutory framework, but 
must fall back on the common law.It also follows that the common law principles, whatever they 
may be, are applicable to a case such as the present, unconstrained by the provisions of any 
statute.' 
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Lord Goff noted that historically it may be correct that statutory prov1s1ons creating a 
discretionary regime for the repayment of taxes or charges presuppose that the common law 
principles give no right to recovery, however, having, where applicable, overlaid and replaced 
the common law principles, whatever those principles may be, they become neutral in their effect 
when the development of those principles is considered by the courts.It was also noted that the 
vast majority of cases concerned with the recovery of tax which is not due will indeed be covered 
by statutory provisions regulating the right of recovery.It was also suggested that, if it should be 
held that s 33 had no application in the Woolwich Building Society case, steps could easily and 
may well be taken 'at an early opportunity to bring cases such as the present, which are in any 
event likely to be very rare, within its ambit.' 
Lord Goff went on(l 8): 
'But in my opinion they cannot, in the last analysis, touch the point of principle, which is that 
we are here concerned with the question of the basis of the common law right of recovery in 
these circumstances, on which statute law has no direct impact.' 
Common law 
The traditional approach of English law has been to regard payments made to another which are 
not legally due as generally irrecoverable and then to seek to define those particular cases in 
which such payments may be recovered in a restitutionary action.Situations in which it is 
recognised that recovery is allowed include cases where a payment is made under duress, fraud 
or undue influence; where it is made as a result of a mistake of fact; or where it is made for a 
consideration which has failed, as where a payment is made under a contract which is 
invalid.Where recovery is allowed the common law mechanism has traditionally been expressed 
in the language of the old forms of action, here the action for money had and received. 
The mere fact that a payment is made under a mistake of law is not a ground for recovery. 
In a number of cases the question has arisen as to whether a citizen may recover a payment 
which he has made in response to a demand by the government or a public authority which there 
is no power to make. The demand may be for the payment of tax or for payment of a fee for the 
provision of goods or services.It may be invalid because the government misconstrued the 
provision providing for a particular type of payment; because the provision relied on is itself 
invalid, for example where the charge is imposed by delegated legislation which is outside the 
terms of the enabling statute; or because there is no provision for such a charge at all.A demand 
may be invalid because it infringes the principles of domestic administrative law, or of European 
Community Law.A similar problem arises where the payment is made before there has been a 
demand but in respect of a charge which there is no power to levy. 
Although the common law has been substantially modified by statute, as has been seen, the 
general principle on which it is based remains important.There are two approaches.The first, 
generally accepted to be the law prior to the decision of the House of Lords in Woolwich 
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Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners (No 2)(19)is that any ultra vires payments are 
recoverable on the same basis as any other payments made to another which are not lawfully 
due.The payer will be able to recover if he can show that one of the ordinary grounds for 
restitution exists.Thus he will be able to recover if he can show, for example, that the payment 
was made as a result of a mistake of fact; or under duress; or pursuant to an agreement that the 
sum would be repaid if it were found not in fact to be due.The second approach, now enshrined 
in the majority decision in the Woolwich Building Society case, recognises a general right to 
restitution in cases of payments in response to ultra vires demands by government or public 
authorities. 
The Woolwich Building Society case concerned the return of payments made by the building 
society in respect of deposits with it which were held not to be due as the regulations pursuant 
to which the payments were made were found to be ultra vires. 
The general right to restitution set out in the Woolwich Building Society case is, however, subject 
to a number of limitations, including one based on the mistake of law rule. 
Under both approaches, therefore, a payment made under mistake of law is irrecoverable in the 
absence of another ground for restitution. 
The applicability of the ordinary private law has been illustrated in various cases over the years. 
In Slater v Burnley Corporation(20) the corporation had demanded from the plaintiff a higher 
water rate than the relevant statute required him to pay.He had objected but paid.It was argued 
that recovery should be allowed simply because of the unlawful nature of the demand.However, 
it was held that there could be no recovery in the absence of a distinct ground for restitution, 
such as duress.Both Cave and Wills JJ held that the payment was a voluntary one.Although the 
corporation had power to cut off the water supply in the event of non-payment of rates it had not 
threatened to do so.Wills J observed that the case was simply the ordinary one of a person raising 
a contention when a demand was made of him, which was not sufficient to constitute duress. 
In William Whiteley Ltd v R(21) the plaintiff sought to recover payments for licences claimed 
by the Revenue in respect of certain canteen workers employed by the plaintiff, on the basis that 
they were 'male servants' under the legislation.The plaintiff disputed this interpretation and 
contended that no licences were needed but nevertheless paid the charges.Eventually he 
successfully disputed the Revenue's interpretation in the courts and sought to recover the 
overpayments.Walton J rejected the contention that money unlawfully demanded by a public 
official may automatically be recovered and held that there could be no recovery since none of 
the ordinary grounds for recovery had been made out, the payments were voluntary and therefore 
irrecoverable and he rejected the submissions of the plaintiffs that they were paid (i) in discharge 
of an illegal demand colore officii or (ii) in any event under duress.Although Walton J referred 
on two occasions to the suppliants being under a mistaken belief that they were bound to pay the 
duties it is clear from his findings that in relation to at least the last three payments they were 
in considerable doubt as to their liability and he said: 
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'The suppliants knew all the facts.They had present to their minds plainly, when these payments 
were made, that there was a question as to whether upon such servants as those in question duty 
was payable.They themselves raised that question and they paid the duties.They could have 
resisted payment.They must have known if proceedings were taken for penalties it would be open 
to them in such proceedings to raise the question as to whether the duties were payable or not, 
as they did, in fact, in 1906. They must have known and must have had present to their minds all 
that.' 
Earlier the judge, after referring to the rule that money paid under mistake of law is irrecoverable 
had said: 
'There is no doubt as to the general rule stated in Leake on Contracts[Sth ed pp622-623] to which 
I have already referred, that money paid voluntarily- that is to say, without compulsion or 
extortion or undue influence, and, of course, I may add without any fraud on the part of the 
person to whom it is paid, and with knowledge of all the facts, though paid without any 
consideration, or in discharge of a claim not due, or a claim which might have been successfully 
resisted, cannot be recovered back.' 
In Mason v New South Wales(22) the High Court of Australia was prepared to find duress when 
the plaintiffs paid a fee for a licence to carry goods, under a scheme which was later held to be 
unconstitutional.The duress was said to lie in the fact that the state might have seized the 
plaintiffs' vehicles had they operated without a licence(a power which they appeared to have 
under the legislation), although it seemed that such seizure had in fact been rare in the past and 
certainly had not been explicitly threatened. 
In National Pari-Mutuel Association Ltd v R(23) the suppliant company claimed repayment of 
betting duty which they had paid for three years in respect of the operation of a totalisator.In 
proceedings involving another such operator the House of Lords had held that on a proper 
construction of the relevant legislation there was no liability to pay the duty.The argument for 
the suppliants was concerned only with whether the mistake under which they had paid the duty 
was one of fact or of law.Branson J and the Court of Appeal held that the mistake was a mistake 
of law and that the payments were not recoverable. 
In the Scottish case Glasgow Corp v Lord Advocate(24) the corporation had for a number of 
years paid purchase tax on stationery manufactured by it and used in its various 
departments.Finally it raised an action for declarator that it was not liable to purchase tax on such 
stationery and for recovery of past payments.It was held that the corporation was not liable to 
purchase tax on stationery manufactured by it and supplied to its public service departments but 
was liable to the tax on stationery supplied to its trading departments.The claim to recovery of 
past payments was dismissed by Lord Wheatley and the First Division unanimously.The first 
ground on which recovery was sought was based on the constitutional argument that since 
Parliament had not authorised the collection by the Customs and Excise Commissioners of the 
tax the corporation was entitled to recover the amounts illegally exacted from it. 
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The Lord President(Lord Clyde) stated two reasons for rejecting the argument.The first was that 
there was no authority for it.He added(25): 
'Indeed, the elaborate statutory provisions in various Finance Acts regarding the precise 
circumstances in which income tax already paid may be reclaimed would have been quite 
unnecessary if the conclusion sought to be drawn by the corporation was sound.' 
The second reason he gave as: 
'It would, in my opinion, introduce an element of quite unwarrantable uncertainty into the 
relations between the taxpayers and the Exchequer if there could be a wholesale opening up of 
transactions between them whenever any court put a new interpretation upon an existing statutory 
provision imposing a tax.' 
The second ground for recovery was based on the condictio indebiti.In relation to this ground it 
was held unanimously that the condictio did not apply to the case of an error in law in 
interpreting an Act of Parliament. 
In Sebel Products Ltd v Customs and Excise Comrs(26) a claim to purchase tax in respect of one 
of their products was made against the plaintiffs.They brought an action for a declaration that the 
product was not so liable and while the action was awaiting trial they paid the sum claimed.The 
circumstances under which they did so do not appear from the report of the case.The plaintiffs 
succeeded in their action for a declaration, but the defendants refused to repay the money.Vaisey 
J held that they were bound to do so. 
He said(27): 
'By the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, s 21(1), the defendants are placed in the same position 
as the ordinary subjects of the Crown and I see no reason why they should not in appropriate 
cases refuse to refund money paid to them voluntarily under a mistake of law as the revenue 
authorities were held to be entitled to do in the case of William Whiteley, Ltd v Rand National 
Pari-Mutuel Assocn Ltd v R.At the same time I cannot help feeling that the defence is one which 
ought to be used with great discretion, and that for two reasons.First, because the defendants, 
being an emanation of the Crown, which is the source and fountain of justice are, in my opinion, 
bound to maintain the highest standards of probity and fair dealing comparable to those which 
the courts, which derive their authority from the same source and fountain, impose on the officers 
under their control..' 
Vaisey J also said(28): 
' .. .I ask myself, first, with what intention the plaintiffs paid the money, and,secondly, with what 
intention the defendants received it? If the intention was the same on both sides, the result, in 
my judgment, was that an agreement was made between the parties by implication.The intention 
of the plaintiffs was, to my mind, clear.They expected to recover the money if they won their 
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action.What was the intention of the defendants? It is irrelevant to speculate on what, if anything, 
was in the mind of the clerk or other subordinate officer who actually received the money or in 
the mind of the officer who paid it into the bank to the defendants' credit and I must assume the 
existence of some person in the defendants' employment who accepted and appropriated the 
money with a full knowledge of all the facts, particularly the discussion which had preceded the 
institution of the action and the pending of the action itself, who knew and realised that the right 
of the defendants to receive the money was at the moment sub judice, and, indeed, on the point 
of coming before this court for decision.What would that hypothetical person have thought about 
it? In my judgment, he would inevitably have come to the conclusion, as a matter of necessary 
inference, that the plaintiffs were paying and the defendants accepting the money subject to 
repayment if the action resulted in the plaintiffs' favour.If, however, he had entertained any doubt 
on the matter, I feel sure that he would as a matter of courtesy have refused to accept the money 
until the position had been made clear to him.What is, to my mind, incredible, is that he could 
ever have supposed that the money was being either paid by the plaintiffs or received by the 
defendants on the footing that the defendants were to keep it in any event.I come, therefore, to 
the conclusion that the intentions of the plaintiffs and the defendants were identical.In other 
words, I find that there was an agreement.' 
Nolan J in Woolwich Equitable Building Society v IRC(29) said: 
'I would say more generally that whenever money is paid to the Revenue pending the outcome 
of a dispute which, to the knowledge of both parties, will determine whether or not the Revenue 
are entitled to the money, an agreement for the repayment of the money if and when the dispute 
is resolved in the taxpayer's favour must inevitably be implied unless the statute itself produces 
that result, as it does, for example, in cases falling within para 10( 4) of Sch 20 to the Finance 
Act 1972.' 
In Tower Hamlets London BC v Chetnik Developments Ltd(30) the House of Lords had occasion 
to considers 9(1) of the General Rate Act 1967 which provides, so far as is material: 
' ... where it is shown to the satisfaction of a rating authority that any amount paid in respect of 
rates, and not recoverable apart from this section, could properly be refunded on the ground 
that...(e) the person who made a payment in respect of rates was not liable to make-that payment, 
the rating authority may refund that amount or part thereof.' 
The House considered a local authority's exercise of a statutory discretion to refund an 
overpayment.Judicial review was sought of the authority's refusal to return an overpayment of 
rates, a decision made in the exercise of an express statutory discretion to refund in the General 
Rate Act 1967.The action succeeded and Lord Bridge stated that, under the statute, the fact that 
the payment was made under a mistake of law was not a consideration which would justify 
refusing recovery.Nor could recovery be refused because of the special financial difficulties which 
would otherwise be faced by the authority.Lord Bridge said(3 l ): 
'So it emerges from these authorities that the retention of moneys known to have been paid under 
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a mistake at law, although it is a course permitted to an ordinary litigant, is not regarded by the 
courts as a · high-minded thing' to do, but rather as a · shabby thing' or a · dirty trick' and hence 
is a course which the court will not allow one of its own officers, such as a trustee in bankruptcy, 
to take .. .I in no way dissent from this reasoning, but I should myself have been content to derive 
the same conclusion from the broader consideration that Parliament must have intended rating 
authorities to act in the same high-principled way expected by the court of its own officers and 
not to retain rates paid under a mistake of law, or on an erroneous valuation ... unless there were, 
as Parliament must have contemplated there might be in some cases, special circumstances in 
which a particular overpayment was made such as to justify retention of the whole or part of the 
amount overpaid.' 
In this case the discretionary power to refund payment of rates for which the person who made 
the payment was not liable had been expressly conferred on local authorities by Parliament. 
Lord Keith of Kinkel observed in the Woolwich Building Society case(32): 
'But it is not open to serious doubt that central Revenue departments have a similar discretionary 
power to make refunds of tax payments which were not legally due.Indeed, it is a power of that 
nature which the Revenue claim to have exercised in the present case, in the course of their 
general function of managing and administering the tax system.So if the Revenue had refused in 
the exercise of their discretion to make the repayment they did in the present case I am of 
opinion that in the absence of any other remedy it would have been open to Woolwich to claim 
repayment in proceedings for judicial review, and there would appear to be no reason why such 
proceedings would not have been successful.' 
In the Tower Hamlets case Lord Bridge also said(33): 
'But, to articulate the apparent principle underlying the section more precisely it is surely 
envisaged in each of the five cases where the section authorises refunds of amounts paid in 
respect of rates which would otherwise be irrecoverable that the ratepayer who has paid rates in 
compliance with a demand note which he might have successfully resisted may appropriately be 
relieved of the consequences of his oversight.' 
Hence in the Tower Hamlets case the House concluded that the refusal of the council to make 
a refund was not in accordance with the statutory intention and so affirmed the decision of the 
Court of Appeal allowing the ratepayers' claim for judicial review of the decision. 
Lord Goff in the Woolwich Building Society case commented(34): 
'It is plain that those principles cannot apply where the discretion is not exercised pursuant to 
a statutory power.If, therefore, in the present case the Revenue was under no contractual 
obligation to repay the money, and had refused to exercise such residuary discretion as it had to 
repay, it is difficult to see on what ground its refusal to repay could have been challenged, except 
on very narrow grounds such as bad faith .. .' 
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Maskell v Horner(35) concerned unlawful demands for market tolls.On the plaintiffs refusal to 
pay seizure took place and thereafter on his solicitor's advice the plaintiff paid under protest.Later 
when the plaintiff challenged the defendant's demands seizure either took place or was 
threatened.Some years later it appeared from a decision in the Chancery Division that the tolls 
had been unlawfully demanded and the plaintiff sued for their recovery.It was held that as he had 
only paid to avoid seizure of his goods and never voluntarily nor intending to give up his rights 
to the sums paid nor to close the transactions, he was entitled to recover those payments which 
were not barred by the statute of limitation.Lord Reading CJ drew a distinction between payments 
made to close a transaction and those made to avoid seizure(36): 
'If a person with knowledge of the facts pays money, which he is not in law bound to pay, and 
in circumstances implying that he is paying it voluntarily to close the transaction, he cannot 
recover it.Such a payment is in law like a gift, and the transaction cannot be reopened.If a person 
pays money, which he is not bound to pay, under the compulsion of urgent and pressing necessity 
or of seizure, actual or threatened, of his goods he can recover it as money had and received.The 
money is paid not under duress in the strict sense of the term, as that implies duress of person, 
but under the pressure of seizure or detention of goods which is analogous to that of 
duress.Payment under such pressure establishes that the payment is not made voluntarily to close 
the transaction.' 
Air Canada v British Columbia(37) concerned a claim by the airline to recover truces levied under 
unconstitutional legislation.It was argued that recovery should be allowed because the payments 
had been made as a result of a mistake of law.Recovery was in fact denied for a number of 
reasons specific to the particular facts and context of the case, and it was thus strictly 
unnecessary for the court to determine whether there was a general right to recover a payment 
made as a result of a mistake of law.Four members of the panel of six who participated in the 
judgment clearly expressed the view that such a right existed in Canadian law. 
Wilson J, in a dissenting judgment, said(38): 
'It is, however, my view that payments made under unconstitutional legislation are not 
"voluntary" in a sense which should prejudice the taxpayer.The taxpayer, assuming the_ validity 
of the statute as I believe it is entitled to do, considers itself obligated to pay.Citizens are 
expected to be law-abiding.They are expected to pay their taxes.Pay first and object later is the 
general rule.' 
La Forest J who delivered the leading judgment on behalf of the majority concluded that(39)-
'the rule should be against recovery of ultra vires taxes, at least in the case of unconstitutional 
statutes' and went on( 40) to reject the proposition that payment under an ultra vires statute 
constituted compulsion. 
It was held in the Air Canada case, by a majority, that there was no right to recover tax paid 
under a statute later found to be unconstitutional.La Forest J, dealing with the argument that the 
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tax had been paid under compulsion, said(41):.'What the rule of compulsion seems to require is 
that there is no practical choice but to pay in the circumstances, or to put it another way, before 
a payment will be regarded as involuntary there must be some natural or threatened exercise of 
power possessed by the party receiving it over the person or prop.erty of the taxpayer for which 
he has no immediate relief than to make the payment ... ' 
Wilson J disagreed, saying( 42): 
'It is, however, my view that payments made under unconstitutional legislation are not 
"voluntary" in a sense which should prejudice the taxpayer.The taxpayer, assuming the validity 
of the statute as I believe it is entitled to do, considers itself obligated to pay ... The payments are 
made pursuant to a perceived obligation to pay which results from the combined presumption of 
constitutional validity of duly enacted legislation and the holding out of such validity by the 
legislature.In such circumstances I consider it quite unrealistic to expect the taxpayer to make its 
payments "under protest".Any taxpayer paying taxes exigible under a statute which it has no 
reason to believe or suspect is other than valid should be viewed as having paid pursuant to the 
statutory obligation to do so.' 
In the American case Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Rly Co v O'Connor(43) Holmes J, delivering 
the judgment of the circuit court for the district of Colorado, was of the opinion that the illegal 
tax paid by the plaintiff was paid under duress.If the plaintiff had not paid he would not only 
have been subject to legal proceedings for recovery of the tax but would have been liable to 
forfeiture of his business until it had been paid. 
It would appear that the case does not vouch the proposition that a mere illegal demand for tax 
by a public authority is a sufficient ground for recovery of payment under it. 
The Atchison Topeka case was one to recover taxes paid under duress and protest.the plaintiff 
contending that the levying statute was unconstitutional and the defendant contending that the 
payment was voluntary. 
Holmes J said(44): 
'It is reasonable that a man who denies the legality of a tax should have a clear and certain 
remedy.The rule being established that apart from special circumstances he cannot interfere by 
injunction with the State's collection of its revenues, an action at law to recover back what he has 
paid is the alternative left.Of course we are speaking of those cases where the State is not put 
to an action if the citizen refused to pay.In these latter he can interpose his objections byway of 
defence, but when, as is common, the State has a more summary remedy, such as distress, and 
the party indicates by protest that he is yielding to what he cannot prevent, courts sometimes 
perhaps have been a little too slow to recognize the implied duress under which payment is 
made.But even if the State is driven to an action, if at the same time the citizen is put at a 
serious disadvantage in the assertion of his legal, in this case of his constitutional, rights, by 
defence in the suit, justice may require that he should be at liberty to avoid those disadvantages 
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by paying promptly and bringing suit on his side.He is entitled to assert his supposed right on 
reasonably equal terms.' 
The serious disadvantages to which the plaintiffs could have been put in the Atchison Topeka 
case were (i) the possible forfeiture of their right to do business within the state until the tax was 
paid and (ii) the incurring of a penalty which would continue to accrue and accumulate pending 
litigation should the plaintiffs ultimately fail. 
Holmes J considered that in these circumstances the payment was made under duress. 
ANALYSIS 
1. A payment may be made because it is believed that there is a legal obligation to make it, but 
this belief turns out to be based on an erroneous view of the law and in fact no such legal 
obligation exists; the error may relate to a statutory obligation, as where a person pays a tax or 
charge to the government when no such charge is legally due. 
2. It is generally accepted that in English law the fact that a payment is made under a mistake 
of law is not of itself a ground for the recovery of the payment.By contrast a payment made 
under a mistake of fact is recoverable.This is clearly so where the mistake is as to a fact which, 
if true, would make the payer liable to pay or where it is · fundamental' and there is support for 
a wider test under which any mistake of fact which causes the payment creates a prima facie 
entitlement to recovery based on unjust enrichment.Recovery is in principle possible 'however 
careless the party paying may have been, in omitting to use due diligence to inquire into the fact.' 
3. The courts are required to draw a distinction between questions of law and questions of fact. 
4. The rule that payments made under a mistake of law are irrecoverable has been the subject of 
dissatisfaction for a long time. 
5.The main argument for reform is that the current rule allows the payee to retain money in 
circumstances in which it seems unjust for him to do so as against the payer.The payee is 
enriched by the receipt of the payment which the mistaken payer did not· intend him to have and 
would not have been made but for the mistake, ie the payment was involuntary.In the context of 
mistake of fact the consequence is that the payee's enrichment is prima facie unjust and 
recoverable in accordance with established rules. 
6. It has been argued that the rule precluding recovery of payments made under a mistake of law 
is justified, in the instance of overpaid taxes, on the basis that it could not be guaranteed that all 
relevant cases could be identified and unfairness in the treatment of payers might result; if 
payments made as a result of a mistake of law were generally recoverable, it could be argued 
that, since such mistakes are frequent, there will often be recovery of payments and payees 
generally will not be able to rely on their receipts. 
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7. It has been stated ( 45) that sums paid to a public authority pursuant to an unlawful rating 
demand, although they might be irrecoverable if an action were brought for repayment, could be 
set off against sums owed by the payer to the same authority.This 'rule' seems to produce an 
anomaly in allowing a set-off but not a direct action for recovery.However, this rule may be 
questionable. 
8. Where there is no right in restitution to the recovery of an invalidly demanded payment, there 
may be a discretion to make a repayment and such a discretion has been exercised in practice: 
eg prior to the introduction of a legislative right to recover, it had been the practice to repay 
excess payments of VAT though made under an error of law.In some cases there may be an 
express statutory discretion( 46) and in others the authority's right to repay will depend on the 
general law concerning the making of ex gratia payments(47).Where there is discretion.whether 
conferred specifically by statute or not, it is reviewable according to the usual principles of 
judicial review.In exercising it the authority must take into account only relevant considerations 
and must not act for improper purposesor in bad faith. 
9. At common law the position of payments made by way of taxes or charges which tum out not 
to be lawfully due will generally be irrecoverable if made under a mistake of law, that is if paid 
in the belief that there is or may be liability to pay when in fact there is no such liability under 
the relevant provision properly construed.In other cases payment may be made in circumstances 
where liability is denied.The traditional approach only allowed recovery where duress could be 
shown or where there was an implied agreement to repay the sum. 
10. The effect of the House of Lords decision in the Woolwich Building Society case is that a 
person who makes a payment in response to an unlawful demand for tax, or any like demand 
from a public official, ie a demand for which there is no basis in law, immediately acquires a 
prima facie right to be repaid the amount as money had and received. 
11. Having reached the view that a general right should be recognised, Lord Goff summarised 
his judgment by holding (at p 681) that-
· ... money paid by a citizen to a public authority in the form of taxes or other levies paid pursuant 
to an ultra vires demand ... is prima facie recoverable ... as of right...' 
He then went on, obiter, to hold that such a principle should apply equally where tax or another 
levy has been exacted as a result of an intra vires but excessive or erroneous demand. 
Lords Browne-Wilkinson and Slynn delivered concurring judgments.Lord Slynn specifically 
agreed that 'the Woolwich principle' could equally apply to intra vires as well as ultra vires 
demands. 
12. The minority judgments in the Woolwich Building Society case given by Lords Keith and 
Jauncey both recorded varying degrees of reluctance in denying a legal right to recovery, yet both 
felt that the present state of the law could not justify a finding for the Woolwich.In the words 
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of Lord Keith at p 668: 
' ... the ... authorities [satisfy] me that they afford no support for Woolwich's major proposition .. .' 
This led his Lordship to hold at p 699, that: 
' ... to give effect to Woolwich's proposition would, in my opinion, amount to a very far-reaching 
exercise of judicial legislation .. .' 
13. In approving the 'Woolwich principle' (recovery of sums of tax overpaid pursuant to ultra 
vires demands) Lords Goff and Slynn go on, strictly obiter, to suggest that the principle should 
apply to all situations where other levies(presumably licence fees, charges and penalties of a 
public law nature) are paid pursuant to ultra vires demands and even where taxes or levies are 
paid pursuant to excessive or erroneous, but intra vires, demands. 
14. All five Law Lords cast considerable doubt on the validity and utility of the 'mistake of law' 
rule.Under the Woolwich principle recovery is grounded in the unlawfulness of the demand and 
not in any mistaken belief of the payer. 
15. Lords Goff and Slynn have given notice that they do not regard the private law concept of 
duress or compulsion as fixed, so that it may, for example, extend to encompass what may be 
portrayed as 'deemed or presumed duress' by a public body of a citizen, in circumstances in 
which the public body has a number of statutory remedies open to it should the citizen fail to pay 
as demanded.This is a concept drawn from the United States, particularly the judgment of Mr 
Justice Holmes in the Atchison Topeka case(to whom all of the majority referred). 
16. Lord Slynn, in the Woolwich Building Society case, stated at p 783 that there was no 
statutory provision on which Woolwich could rely to reclaim the taxes overpaid or any 
interest.Section 33 of the Taxes Management Act 1970; even if it applied to composite rate tax, 
was riot applicable for a number of reasons, not least that no valid assessment could be made 
urider an invalid regulation, that no assessment was in fact made and that, even if made, the 
assessment could not on the facts of the present case have been said to be · excessive by reason 
of some error or mistake in a return.'In other areas Parliament has specifically provided that tax 
paid which was not lawfully due to be paid may be recovered and it has laid down the machinery 
and the conditions for repayment, including the payment of interest.None of these other statutory 
provisions applies to the Woolwich Building Society case. 
17.Lord Slynn said at p 783: 
'I do not consider that the fact that Parliament has legislated extensively in this area means that 
no principle of recovery at common law can or should at this stage of the development of the law 
be found to exist.If the principle does exist that tax paid on a demand from the Crown when the 
tax was the subject of an ultra vires demand can be recovered as money had and received then, 
in my view, it is for the courts to declare it.In so doing they do not usurp the legislative 
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function.I regard the proper approach as the converse.If the legislature finds that limitations on 
the common law principle are needed for reasons of policy or good administration then they can 
be adopted by legislation, eg by a short limitation period, presumptions as to validity, even a 
power in the courts to limit the effects of any order for recovery comparable to that conferred 
on the Court of Justice of the European Communities by art 174 of the EEC Treaty.' 
18. Lord Slynn said at p 787: 
'I find it quite unacceptable in principle that the common law should have no remedy for a 
taxpayer who has paid large sums or any sum of money to the Revenue when those sums have 
been demanded pursuant to an invalid regulation and retained free of interest pending a decision 
of the courts.' 
19. While the Bill of Rights contained the constitutional principle that only such taxation as is 
authorised by Parliament may be levied, it was inconsistent to allow the Revenue to achieve by 
the back door(collecting taxes without authority) what it could not achieve by the front. 
20. For the first time, as a result of the Woolwich principle, the taxpayer has been placed in the 
same position as the government- which can already recover sums overpaid by it, as of right. 
21. The House of Lords' pronouncement in the Woolwich Building Society case that a taxpayer 
is entitled to recover as of right meant that interest would run under the Supreme Court Act 1981. 
22. The Woolwich's initiative in bringing the case provided a unique opportunity to recognise 
developments in the law by declaring the existence of a right to restitution in such 
circumstances.No reliance could be placed on the government to introduce legislation to the same 
effect, unless it was pushed into it, because the present unsatisfactory condition of the law was 
in the Treasury's interest.The government's reaction to the wider form of the principle(expressed 
to be obiter) under which recovery can be made of excessive sums(tax and non-tax)paid in 
response to intra vires demands, is also awaited as it may feel it has to override or limit in some 
way so as to 'protect the security ofptiblic finances.'Further legislative action (even retrospective) 
may now be likely in response to the Woolwich case. 
23. There should be uniformity of approach to overpayments in statutory provisions.Some 
existing legislation gives a right to recover based simply on the unlawful nature of the levy, eg 
provisions on VAT, Rates and also those on Inheritance Tax.It seems inconsistent to allow a right 
of recovery based solely on invalidity in these cases, whilst requiring proof of mistake in others. 
24. Many commentators believe that there should be a right to recover overpaid taxes based 
simply on the fact of overpayment.What is needed is a general right against public authority 
payees, rather than, as in the case of private law, one based on the circumstances of the payer. 
25. Statutory reform could involve elaborate legislation since it would require the identification 
and solution of a number of issues-
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* disruption to public finances 
* payments in accordance with the prevailing general practice 
* compromises or submissions to claims 
* defences such as change of position/estoppel 
* special limitation periods for public authorities 
26. Disruption of public finances could ensue if a levy which is made is declared invalid and 
has to be returned.When a large number of payments have to be returned the authorities will have 
to make up the shortfall.A distinction would have to be drawn between different types of invalid 
decisions and this approach hasbeen adopted in a number of statutory rights of recovery, in 
particular Income Tax and Corporation Tax, Capital Gains Tax, Petroleum Revenue Tax and 
Inheritance Tax which preclude recovery of charges levied in accordance with general practice. 
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Section 102 is the only section in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 dealing with 'Refunds' and 
provides that: 
'l 02.(l) If it is proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that any amount paid by a 
taxpayer was in excess of the amount properly chargeable under this Act, the Commissioner 
may authorize a refund to such taxpayer OG any tax overpaid:Provided that no amount paid in 
respect of an assessment accepted by the taxpayer and made in accordance with the practice 
generally prevailing at the date of that assessment shall be deemed to have been otherwise 
than properly so chargeable. 
(2) The Commissioner shall not authorize any refund under this section unless the claim 
therefor is made within three years after the date of the assessment under which such tax was 
payable or, where such tax was chargeable and was payable under this Act otherwise than 
under an assessment, the date of payment of such tax(which date shall for the purposes of this 
subsection be deemed to be the date of the official receipt acknowledging such payment or, 
where more than one such payment was made, the date of the official receipt acknowledging 
the latest of such payments). 
(3) If in respect of any year of assessment of any taxpayer(other than a company) ending on 
or after 28 February 1983-
(a) the taxpayer's income for such year consisted solely of any amount or amounts of 
remuneration as defined in the Fourth Schedule; 
. . 
(b) a period of at least three years has elapsed since the end of such year of assessment; and 
(c) the taxpayer was not required under any provision of this Act to furnish a return of 
income for such year of assessment and did not render such a return during the period 
referred to in paragraph (b ), 
the Commissioner shall not authorize a refund of any amount of employees tax deducted or 
withheld from such remuneration under the provisions of the said Schedule unless the claim 
therefor is made within the period referred to in paragraph (b ). ' 
Comment and interpretation 
Section l 02 is effective in this form in respect of all claims for refunds made on or after the 
date of promulgation of the Income Tax Act 69 of 1975: 23 July 1975. 
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Section 102(1) has been in its present form for more than fifty years, being largely unaltered 
since its predecessor, s 89, in the Income Tax Act 31 of 1941 (1 ).The section covers all taxes 
provided for in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 as the word 'tax' is defined ins 1 of the Act 
as meaning 'any levy or tax leviable under this Act' and for the purposes of Part 1 V of 
Chapter 111 includes any levy or tax leviable under any previous Income Tax Act or any tax 
on persons or the incomes of persons leviable under any ordinance of a provincial council. 
Section 102(2) was expanded by s 28(1) of the Income Tax Act 1975 and its wording 
corresponds with that of s 79.The amendment followed upon the decision in Stroud Riley & 
Co Ltd v SIR(2) where it was held that neither the mere inaction of the Secretary nor his tacit 
acceptance of a return accompanying payment of non-resident shareholders' tax could operate 
as an assessment and that there was consequently no limiting period within which a claim for 
a refund of this tax had to be made. 
Although there is a formal procedure laid down for objection and appeal against an 
assessment for tax, it very often happens in practice that, for one reason or another, taxpayers 
do not lodge an objection against an assessment in the stipulated period.This may be due to a 
lack of knowledge on the taxpayer's part that he has sufficient grounds for objection, or it 
may be due simply to carelessness or inefficiency.Whatever the reason for the delay, it is 
very important to know and understand what other remedy is available to the taxpayer should 
he fail to follow correctly the procedure for objection. 
On receipt of an assessment and after scrutiny a taxpayer is dissatisfied with it; there are a 
number of steps to be taken if a taxpayer wishes to ensure that he has, at least, a chance of 
lessening his liability for tax.Even where a taxpayer intends to object to an assessment, he is 
still required to pay the full amount of tax owing by the date shown on the assessment as the 
date for payment.If the objection or appeal is successful, any tax paid in excess of the 
taxpayer's true liability will be refunded together with interest. 
The first function of s 88 is to ensure that the obligation to pay and the right to receive and 
recover any tax chargeable under the Act will not be suspended by any appeal or pending the 
decision of a court of law under s 86A unless the Commissioner so directs.The second 
function of s 88 is to provide that, if an assessment is altered on appeal or in conformity with 
any such decision or in conformity with the Commissioner's decision to concede an appeal to 
the Special Court or such a court of law, a 'due adjustment' must be made.Amounts paid in 
excess must be refunded with interest at the 'prescribed rate' as defined in s 1, calculated 
from the date proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioner to be the date on which the 
excess was received.Amounts shortpaid are recoverable with interest calculated as provided in 
s 89. 
In CIR v NCR Corporation of South Africa(Pty)Ltd(3) it emerged that, under the law as it 
then stood, a taxpayer could not claim interest on a refund of tax overpaid unless the refund 
resulted from a successful appeal to a court or was made in conformity with a decision of a 
court.Should Inland Revenue have conceded the issue before court proceedings commenced or 
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have withdrawn from the action before a judicial decision was handed down, the taxpayer 
would have been entitled to no interest.The practice of Inland Revenue, however, had been to 
pay interest if it made a refund of tax when it withdrew from a case before it was heard, and 
the court in the case referred to considered it desirable that the practice and the law be 
brought into conformity with each other.In fact, though, the amendment( 4) went further and 
authorized not only the payment of interest to the successful taxpayer in such circumstances 
but also a refund of the tax overpaid ahead of a court decision. 
A taxpayer should first check his assessment to ensure the accuracy of the arithmetical 
calculations in it.The taxpayer must ensure that all the information given in the return is 
correctly reflected in the assessment.A copy of the return must be available for this purpose. 
The following provisions of the Act describe the assessing function and objection to it-
Section 77(1) provides that all assessments required to be made under the Act shall be made 
by the Commissioner or under his direction. 
Section 78(1) enables the Commissioner to estimate a person's taxable income where such 
person is in default in furnishing any return or information or the Commissioner is not 
satisfied with the return or information furnished by any person. 
Section 81 ( 1) provides for objections to be made to assessments and s 81 ( 5) provides that 
where no objection is made to any assessment, subject to the right of appeal, it becomes final 
and conclusive. 
Section 83 provides for appeals against decisions of the Commissioner to a special court for 
hearing income tax appeals. 
Section 88 provides that pending an appeal the obligation to pay income tax shall not, unless 
the Commissioner so directs, be suspended. 
Section 89(1) provides that the Commissioner will determine the date on which income tax 
chargeable shall be paid and s 89(2) provides for interest payable on overdue payments. 
Section 91(1)(a) deems income tax payable to be a debt due to the State ands 91(1)(b) 
empowers the Commissioner, where income tax or interest has not been paid, to file with the 
clerk or registrar of any competent court a certified statement setting forth the amount of 
income tax or interest due and provides that such statement thereupon has the effect of a civil 
judgment. 
Section 92 makes it incompetent for any person in any proceedings in connection with any 
statement filed in terms of s 91(1)(b) to question the correctness of any assessment on which 
such statement is based, notwithstanding that objection and appeal may have been lodged 
thereto. 
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Section 94 provides that the production of any document under the hand of the Commissioner 
purporting to be a copy of an extract from any notice of assessment shall be conclusive 
evidence of the making of such assessment and, except in the case of appeal proceedings, 
shall be conclusive evidence that the particulars of such assessment are correct. 
Section 102(1) providing for repayment of income tax proved to the satisfaction of the 
Commissioner to have been overpaid and s 102(2) which provides that the Commissioner may 
not authorise such repayment unless the claim therefor is made within three years after the 
date of the assessment in question. 
It is against the background of these provisions that s I 02 must be seen to operate.Its 
importance lies in the fact that it creates a 'last opportunity' for the taxpayer to be able to 
attack an assessment.The rights of a taxpayer are of the utmost significance in this set of 
circumstances. 
It must be stressed that the finality of an assessment is made subject to the provisions of s 
102 and so is subject to the three-year limitation rule in the section.It is interesting to note 
thats 81(5),,which provides for 'final and conclusive' assessments(where no objections are 
made to any assessment or where objections have been allowed or withdrawn) makes no 
mention of the provisions of s 102. 
If a taxpayer discovers that an assessment is excessive after the expiry of the appeal period or 
the determination of an appeal and where there is no possibility of having the assessment 
amended by making a late appeal, the only way to recover the excessive tax paid is by 
making a valid claim for error or mistake relief under s I 02.The purpose of the section is to 
allow for situations where a taxpayer has made a bona fide mistake in a return.The need for a 
right to relief, rather than a mere administrative discretion to give it, is clear but a fair balance 
has to be achieved between equity and administrative convenience.There is no doubt that 
protection should be given to the taxpayer who has overstated his income and therefore 
subjected himself to a larger tax than he was liable to because many taxpayers do not 
understand all the intricacies and complications of the documents they are sent.People make 
mistakes because of complexity of the tax system and overpayments arise 'in consequence of 
some slip of memory or some failure to appreciate the reading of the very difficult forms we 
have to fill up.' 
It cannot, however, be said, on an analysis of s 102, that the section gives the taxpayer equal 
rights(or any thing like it) with the tax collector in regard to rectifying cases of 
over-assessment.The section, as will be seen, is tightly drawn and by no means all who have 
overpaid tax can obtain relief. 
Section 102 provides that the Commissioner MAY authorize a refund of any tax 
overpaid.However, it must be proved to HIS satisfaction that an amount in excess of that 
properly chargeable was paid.The exercise of his discretion has NOT been made subject to 
objection and appeal, which means that unless he does not apply his mind properly to a 
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particular application, there is nothing that can be done if he refuses it.This should be 
contrasted with a taxpayer's rights under the procedure laid down for objection and appeal, 
where a taxpayer may appeal against the Commissioner's decision to the Income Tax Special 
Court and against that court's decision, on a point of law, to higher courts.Clearly, it is 
preferable to make a valid objection rather than to rely upon an application for a refund. 
The pre-requisites for a valid claim under s 102 are: 
(1) an excessive assessment 
(2) tax charged under it 
(3) payment of that tax by the claimant 
( 4) an error or mistake in a return and 
(5) a causal link between that error or mistake and the excessive assessment. 
Tax paid by the claimant on an excessive assessment 
It is clear from the wording of s 102 that relief is unavailable if the tax has not already been 
paid.It is also clear that an assessment must have been made but will not be fatal where the 
tax was chargeable and payable otherwise than under an assessment(eg as in the case of 
non-resident shareholders' tax). 
The term · assessment' is defined in s 1 as meaning 'the determination by the Commissioner, 
by way of a notice of assessment served in a manner contemplated in sl 06(2), (a) of an 
amount upon which any tax leviable under the Act is chargeable or (b) of the amount of any 
such tax or (c) of any loss ranking for set-off. 
In Irvin & Johnson(SA)Ltd v CIR(5) Watermeyer CJ said: 
· Now the word 'assessment' is defined in the Act as · the determination of an amount upon 
which any tax leviable under this Act is chargeable' unless the context otherwise indicates.An 
examination of various sections will show that the word is used in the Act in more senses 
than one.The word may denote something subjective, ie, the mental process or act of 
determining such amount, but it is more usually used to denote something objective, ie the 
visible representation by word and figures of that mental process.Subjectively, an assessment 
is an abstraction which has no real existence until it is published by being expressed in 
symbols which convey a meaning to others.So long as it is locked up in the mind of the 
assessing officer, who is not necessarily the Commissioner, it cannot be dealt with as required 
by the Act.Its particulars cannot be recorded by anyone except the assessing officer, they 
cannot be filed ... the Commissioner cannot issue the assessment.nor can he alter it.It seems 
clear, therefore, that in most places in the Act the word · assessment' does not mean the 
unexpressed thoughts of the assessing officer, but the written representation of those thoughts.' 
It is at the assessment stage, then, that questions of liability would ordinarily arise and the 
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legislature contemplated that at that stage they should be settled. 
An error or mistake 
A taxpayer may apply for a refund under s 102 if he neglected to claim a deduction to which 
he was entitled, for example, if he did not claim an investment allowance on machinery or 
plant used in a process of manufacture or similar process.He may apply if an amount has been 
included in his income that he considers should not have been, for example, because it was of 
a capital nature or from a source outside South Africa.He may also apply if all that has 
happened is that a mistake was made in his assessment. 
Section 102(1) merely uses the words 'in excess of the amount properly chargeable under this 
Act'.Its wording is much wider than s 33 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 which uses the 
words ' ... the assessment was excessive by reason of some error or mistake in a return . .' 
Silke(6) states: 
'Tax overpaid under a mistake of law as well as of fact is refundable, subject to the 
provisions of s 102 . .' 
Meyerowitz(?) states: 
'The provision clearly covers a mistake of law on the part of the taxpayer, who would 
otherwise be without remedy.If there was such a mistake of law, it would even not matter that 
the taxpayer failed timeously to raise an objection.In CrownMines Ltd v CIR(8) the Appellate 
Division did not decide, as there was no necessity to do so, whether the provision also 
extended to a mistake of fact although the Court a quo whose judgment was confirmed held 
so ... There is, however, no indication, it is considered, that the provision is intended to apply 
only to a mistake of law.Where the Legislature wants to distinguish between fact and law, it 
says so, see eg section 86(1).' 
In Crown Mines Ltd v CIR(9) Innes CJ said: 
'Now it is at the assessment stage that questions of liability would ordinarily arise, and the 
legislature contemplated that at that stage they should be settled.Elaborate provision is made 
for lodging objections to an assessment, for the settlements of disputes arising therefrom, and 
for an appeal in all questions of law to the Superior ·courts ... And the position of a taxpayer, 
like the appellant company, who had failed timeously to raise an objection to the assessment, 
and who alleged an overpayment under a mistake of law, would ordinarily be hopeless.For no 
remedy by way of condictio would be open to him.Whether such a remedy would lie under 
similar circumstances in respect of an overpayment made under a mistake of fact is a point ·on 
which it is unnecessary to express an opinion.' 
The dispute in the Crown Mines case related to a question of law and Innes CJ remarked-
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' ... and in the absence of such consideration as fraud, the taxpayer would, apart from section 
95,[now s 102] be without remedy.'(10) 
So too, the dispute in Stroud Riley & Co Ltd v SIR( 11) concerryed a mistake of law. 
In ITC 1544(12) Melamet J said: 
'The claim for a refund was made in terms of s 102(1) of the Act alleging that the amount 
paid was in excess of the amount properly chargeable, in which event the Commissioner 
would be obliged to refund the overpayment irrespective of whether such overpayment was 
made under a mistake of law or fact.' 
And Cloete J said in the Stroud Riley case(13): 
'A careful reading of s 102(1) reveals that the intention of the enacting part thereof was 
clearly to empower the respondent to authorize a refund in all cases where it is proved to his 
satisfaction that there has been a payment in excess of the amount properly chargeable.' 
In dealing with the equivalent s 95 of Act 41 of 1917 Innes CJ said in the CrownMines 
case(l4): 
'Its terms have been substantially set out above, but its scope and object will be better 
realized when we consider the position which it occupies in the scheme of the Act.Speaking 
generally, assessment must precede payment; the obligation to pay only arises upon a due 
assessment.' 
It should be noted that s 33 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 does not provide for a 
general right to recover tax not due but the right depends on proof of 'error or mistake.'It 
applies to errors and mistakes both of fact and law.In contrast, s 102, it is submitted, does 
provide for a general right to recover tax not due, subject, of course, to the parameters of the 
section. 
Both the Taxes Management Act and our Income Tax Act give no direct guidance as to what 
is meant by an 'error or mistake' and there is very little case law on the subject in England 
and South Africa. 
It would be safe to say that there must be some inaccuracy or incorrect belief, or some 
misconception, misunderstanding or false or mistaken view. 
It has been said(l 5) that the words 'error or mistake' have a very wide meaning and although 
it would be impossible to describe all the circumstances they cover, the following would seem 
to be included-
- Omissions, eg some allowable expense may not have been deducted in the profit and loss 
account. 
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- Errors in original entries in the accounting records 
- Arithmetical errors, eg errors in stock sheets 
- Inadvertant errors of principle concerning tax law, eg a capital receipt counted as income 
- A misunderstanding concerning the relevant facts relating to a transaction or event 
In the Crown Mines case(l 6) the appellant asked the Supreme Court to review the statutory 
decision of the Commissioner refusing a refund of certain payments of dividend tax for the 
years 1917 and 1918 and to set aside the relative assessments for those years in so far as they 
related to those payments and to compel the Commissioner to authorize a refund of the 
amounts in question. 
Some ten years back the company borrowed a million of money which had been used for 
purposes of 'capital expenditure' as statutorily defined. This debt was liquidated in the 
following year by the proceeds of debentures issued to cover the exact amount.These 
debentures were in course of redemption by the company at the rate of about £80 000 per 
annum.The company was assessed for dividend tax on these redemptions for the years 1917, 
1918 and 1919.The tax in dispute was assessed and paid for the first two years in 1919 and 
for the third year in l 920. 
The company's claim for a refund of the tax paid on the redemption amounts for the three 
years was fully debated at interviews between special representatives of the parties.It was 
advanced on various grounds.Two of them depended on the frame of the accounts and the 
third was based on the terms of s 3 8 of Act 41 of 1917. 
The first two contentions were rejected in toto by the Commissioner and the third was 
allowed in respect of the 1919 assessment, because of the special provisions of the Income 
Tax Amendment Act of that year, but disallowed as regards the years 1917 and 1918. 
As far as the merits of the alleged overpayment was concerned, s 3 8 defined the 'dividend 
distributed' upon which by an earlier clause (35) a tax at a specified rate was levied.The 
points which arose were whether the redemption amounts for the years in question fell outside 
the taxable limits as defined by the Act and, if so, whether the statutory decision of the 
Commissioner to the contrary could be disturbed. 
In the Stroud Riley case(l 7) the taxpayer, a company resident in the United Kingdom, had 
paid non-resident shareholders' tax for certain years in excess of that properly chargeable in 
terms of the Income Tax Act read with the relevant provisions of the Double Taxation 
Agreement between the Republic of South Africa and the United Kingdom.The company had 
claimed a refund of all the tax overpaid. 
Between the years 1965 to 1971 overpayments totalling R23 393 had been made by the 
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applicant's subsidiary company in respect of non-resident shareholders' tax on dividends 
declared by the subsidiary and payable to the applicant.It would seem that the tax was 
wrongly calculated and paid at rates between 7 1/2% and 15% in terms of s 45 of the Income 
Tax Act 1962, instead of at the rate of 5%, which was the maximun:i permissible rate under 
the relevant Double Taxation Agreement between the Republic of South Africa and the 
United Kingdom. 
In ITC 1544( 18) a Dutch company had held most of the shares in a company incorporated in 
South Africa.From its South African subsidiary it derived dividend income, from which 
non-resident shareholders' tax had been withheld in terms of s 42(1) of the Income Tax Act.It 
claimed a refund of this tax in terms of s 102(1 ). 
The basis of its claim was that, as a non-South African company required to pay the tax on 
dividends received from a South African subsidiary, it was being discriminated against, since 
a South African company in similar circumstances would not be required to pay the tax.It 
accordingly claimed the protection of art 25 of the tax treaty between South Africa and the 
Netherlands. 
This provides that the nationals of one of the states, whether they are residents of that state or 
not, are not to be subject in the other state to any taxation more burdensome than the taxation 
to which nationals of that other state in the same circumstances are subjected. 
Melamet J, President of the Transvaal Special Court for Hearing Income Tax Appeals, noting 
that the sole criterion for the imposition of non-resident shareholders' tax in terms of s 42(1) 
is the taxpayer's nationality, held that this manifested a discrimination against the taxpayer 
and was offensive in terms of art 25.Moreover, s 108 of the Income Tax Act made that Act 
itself subject to the terms of a double taxation treaty once statutory status has been conferred 
on the treaty. 
It followed that, in terms of art 25, which, in the light of s l 08 governs s 42(1), no 
non-resident shareholders' tax was payable by the Dutch company as a national and resident 
of the Netherlands on the dividends that were paid to it by its South African subsidiary. 
The taxpayer-company had claimed a refund in terms of s I 02(1) of an amount of RI 330 
833, 54 being the NRST it paid in terms of s 42(1) over the period 8 October l 987 to 30 
June 1990 on dividends it received from a subsidiary company. 
The Commissioner had rejected the claim and the taxpayer had raised an objection against his 
rejection and on this not being upheld it noted an appeal to the Special Court. 
Although not discussed in the case, it is submitted that the facts revealed an error of law on 
the part of the Commissioner. 
In CIR v City Deep Ltd(l 9) the taxpayer-company had been the holder of a right to mine 
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under a Bewaarplaats, granted in terms of s 52(2) of the Precious and Base Metals Act 35 of 
1908(Transvaal).The consideration payable under this grant consisted of seventeen annual 
payments of £6, 560.In his assessment of the company for normal income tax, the 
Commissioner disallowed the deduction of this payment, as being an outlay of a capital 
nature.The company accepted this disallowance as being correct up to the year of assessment 
ended 30th June 1920, but appealed against the disallowance in respect of the year 1921. 
The Special Court allowed this appeal and per incuriam made its order, amending the 
assessment, apply also to the 1920 year of assessment, the assessment for that year being 
before it on other grounds. 
The Commissioner did not carry the question further, but refunded the appropriate amounts in 
respect of the years 1920 and 1921.The company then applied for a refund in respect of the 
year 1919 under the provisions of s 95 of Act 41 of 1 91 7, the precursor to s 102. This 
application was refused by the Commissioner. 
A few English cases will also demonstrate the application of· error or mistake' relief. 
In Heastie v Veitch(20) a firm of accountants carried on business from premises owned by the 
senior partner and although rent of £1 250 was paid each year, only£705(being the annual 
value of the premises) was deducted in the accounts.It was successfully claimed that the rent 
paid was deductible and that as a consequence error or mistake relief was due in respect of 
previous years. 
In Radio Pictures Ltd v CIR(21) the company had a licence under which it could exploit 
motion pictures provided that it paid 70 per cent of the gross receipts to its American 
parent.Its accounts were prepared and audited on the basis that transactions with the parent 
company were sterling transactions, and the resulting profit was assessed accordingly.The 
company subsequently contended that the accounts were mistaken in showing the debts as 
sterling debts and claimed that corrected accounts showed heavy losses had been incurred.The 
company's contentions regarding the interpretation of the contract with its parent were 
successful, and consequently error or mistake relief was allowed for the years in which 
accounts had reflected some misapprehension or misconstruction of the document by the 
accountant. 
In Carrimore Six Wheelers Ltd v CIR(22) the claim related to rents from the hiring out of an 
advertisement hoarding on part of the company's business premises.From 1931 to 1941 three 
consecutive firms of accountants acting for the company had deliberately, and with the 
knowledge and consent of the Inspector of Taxes, treated the rents as part of the trading 
profits.Assessments had been made accordingly.This treatment was for convenience of 
computation and assessment, but it was incorrect because the rent should have been assessed 
under the old Schedule Aon the tenant.Indisputably there had been incorrect entries in the 
company's returns. 
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In 1941 the company adopted the correct treatment of the rental income and made an error or 
mistake claim for all years after 1934-35.The Revenue refused this claim on the grounds that 
the assessment had been made on a basis which had been deliberately adopted by the 
company and acceded to on behalf of the Crown, and that therefore they were not excessive 
by reason of any error or mistake by the company. 
In the English provision an error or mistake by the Revenue is not the subject of this 
relief.This should be contrasted with s 102 where, it is submitted, a mistake made by the 
Revenue would also fall within the ambit of the section. 
It is submitted that there is no need to distinguish, in terms of s 102, between a deliberately 
incorrect entry in a return from one made through sheer carelessness or ignorance. 
In the English law unless a claim relates to an error or mistake in a return, no relief will be 
available.It is submitted that this is not the case in our law where s 102 provides much wider 
relief.Moreover, in England, because relief is only available where an assessment was 
excessive by reason of some error or mistake in a return, there has to be some causal link 
between the return and the excessive assessment, and not merely some arithmetical error in 
the assessment. 
In our law the taxpayer only has to satisfy the Commissioner that he has paid an amount 
which was in excess of the amount properly chargeable under the Act.It would be obvious, 
though, that under our law there would also usually be a causal link between the return and 
the excessive assessment.However, in terms of s 102,it is submitted that the taxpayer would 
not be confined to relief only by reason of some error or mistake in a return. 
By contrast, in Australia, it has been only for assessments for the year commencing on 1 July 
1985 and subsequent years, that the Commissioner can now amend assessments to correct 
mistakes of law(22a). 
Section 170 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 gives the Commissioner a discretion to 
amend, subject to the section, at any time, any assessment by making such alterations therein 
or additions thereto as he thinks necessary, notwithstanding that tax may have been paid in 
respect of the assessment(23). 
An amendment effecting a reduction in the liability of a taxpayer under an assessment is not 
to be made after the end of (our years(24). 
A taxpayer is able to obtain an amendment that will reduce his tax liability and this may 
come about by the taxpayer requesting the Commissioner to act on certain information 
provided by him and issue an amended assessment(25). 
The Commissioner is empowered to amend an assessment by making such alterations to it or 
additions as he thinks necessary to correct an error in calculation or a mistake of fact or to 
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prevent avoidance of tax as the case may be(26). 
Under the self-assessment system operating in Australia special provisions have been added to 
provide the Commissioner an extended time in which to review amendments favourable to 
taxpayers, where the Commissioner has relied on a taxpayer's statement.This provision allows 
the Commissioner to undo what was previously implemented under a taxpayer's 
self-assessment action(28). 
Circumstances precluding relief 
There are two limitations imposed on the Commissioner's power to grant a refund.Firstly, if 
an assessment was made in accordance with the practice generally prevailing at the time and 
was accepted by the taxpayer, no refund may be claimed.The practice referred to is the 
practice of the Department of Inland Revenue and is something more than the particular 
approach to assessments of a single Receiver's office.A true departmental practice is a means 
of filling a gap in the tax law or of interpretation of an unsettled matter or of granting a 
concession that is fairly widely adopted by offices throughout South Africa.For example, 
certain professional men who were once taxed on the so-called · receipts basis' instead of the 
'accruals basis'. 
Secondly, a claim for a refund must be made within three years from the date of the 
assessment under which the tax was payable or, where such tax was chargeable and was 
payable under the Act otherwise than under an assessment, the date of payment of such tax, 
which date shall, for the purposes of s 102(2) be deemed to be the date of the official receipt 
acknowledging such payment or, where more than one such payment was made, the date of 
the official receipt acknowledging the latest of such payments.The term 'assessment' must be 
given the meaning it bears in the definition in s 1 of the Act and the 'date of assessment' is 
defined in sl as the date specified in the notice of assessment as the due date, or, when no 
due date is specified, the date of the notice.The three-year period runs from the date of 
assessment and the Commissioner is prohibited from authorizing a refund if the claim for it is 
made after the three-year period.It is important to note that the restriction does not apply to 
the last three years of assessment.In fact, an assessment notice may be issued many years 
after the year of assessment to which it relates, or it may be a revised or additional 
assessment that takes the place of an original assessment issued some years ago.Any number 
of years of assessment may thus be involved as long as the dates of the relevant assessment 
notices fall within the three-year period. 
In England a written notice of claim to relief has to be made to the Board of Inland Revenue 
not later than six years after the end of the tax year or accounting period in which the 
assessment was made.An assessment is made when the inspector signs the certificate in the 
assessment book and not when the notice of assessment is issued. 
No guidance is given in s 102 on the form the claim should take, the section merely uses the 
word 'claim'.Clearly, the claim for a refund should provide the fullest possible information to 
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enable it to receive proper consideration. 
Section l 02( l) provides that 
'no amount paid in respect of an assessment accepted by the taxpayer and made in accordance 
with the practice generally prevailing at the date of that assessment shall be deemed to have 
been otherwise than properly so chargeable.' 
Silke states(29): 
'The "practice generally prevailing" at the time, it is submitted, is the practice known to and 
applied by the Commissioner, whether it is founded on his own interpretation of the law or 
upon the then existing judicial interpretation of thelaw.Furthermore, it is considered that a 
"practice generally prevailing" is one that has been authorized by the Commissioner and is 
being applied throughout thecountry.For example, it cannot be said that a practice that has its 
origin in a local office of a receiver of revenue falls within the concept of a "practice 
generally prevailing".And it will not avail a taxpayer to invoke a new interpretation of the 
courts in support of a claim that earlier assessments made by the Commissioner were wrong, 
since, if those earlier assessments were made in accordance with the established practice of 
the Commissioner, the taxpayer has no right to a refund in terms of s l 02.' 
A recent decision of the Appellate Division, CIR v SA Mutual Unit Trust Management Co 
Ltd(30), deals with the question of what constitutes a 'practice generallyprevailing'. 
The question for determination in this case was whether the Commissioner was entitled to 
reopen an assessment and raise an additional assessment in terms of s 79(1) of the Income 
Tax Act in circumstances in which the taxpayer contended thathe was precluded from doing 
so, since the original assessment allowing the deduction in full of the cost price of certain 
shares was issued 'in accordance with the practice generally prevailing' at the date it was 
issued.More particularly, the Appellate Division was called upon to determine whether, in the 
assessment of taxpayers who had carried on dividend-stripping operations at the relevant time, 
there was a generally prevailing practice that dividend-stripping losses should be allowed. 
The soundness of the taxpayer's case depended upon the meaning to be attached tothe words 
'practice generally prevailing' and upon the evidence whether the taxpayer had discharged the 
onus of showing that a relevant practice generally prevailed at the time of the original 
assessment, on or about l April 1982, under which the Commissioner allowed 
dividend-stripping losses. 
In his judgment in the Special Court, Berman J held that the words 'practice generally 
prevailing' related to-
, a practice which is both known to the Commissioner and which he has authorized for 
application by the various Receivers of Revenue in the Republic.' 
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He also held that the burden of proving the existence of such a 'practice generally prevailing' 
rested upon the taxpayer, who had 
'to prove, on a preponderance of probabilities, that a practice generally prevailed at the time 
of [the taxpayer's] 1981 assessment allowing for losses such as that claimed by [the taxpayer] 
as a legitimate deduction.' 
In his judgment Berman J had relied on 'Silke'(31). 
The taxpayer led evidence at the hearing before the Special Court to the effect that it was the 
Commissioner's practice to allow such a deduction.Witnesses testified to circumstances in 
which such deductions had been allowed.But an officialin the Commissioner's office testified 
that it was not the practice of Inland Revenue to allow losses incurred in dividend-stripping 
operations.In those instances in which such losses had been allowed, Inland Revenue had 
adopted a new system of assessment referred to as the 'auditing system', under which a 
taxpayer's return was initially accepted at its face value and an assessment issued 
accordingly.Thereafter, within the ensuing three years, the return would be thoroughly 
checked and investigated in order to determine whether the original assessment was correct. 
The witness called by the Commissioner was at the time a member of the Law Interpretation 
section in the Commissioner's office.His section advised the Commissioner in tax matters.He 
explained how a practice became established within Inland Revenue.His evidence was 
summed up by Corbett CJ in this way: 
'When Receivers experience a problem in assessment it is referred to the Commissioner's 
office.The Law Interpretation section then evaluates the problem and advises the Receivers 
what approach to adopt.This is done by circular minutes distributed to Receivers throughout 
the country.Subsequently the point is included inthe official income tax handbook, distributed 
within the Department.The handbookis not available to the public.Receivers are not permitted 
to establish practices on their own.' 
It was also of importance to note that, while there were some thirty receivers' offices in the 
country, the admissible evidence led by the taxpayer related to the allowance of such losses 
by only one such office, namely, the Johannesburg office. 
On the meaning of a 'practice generally prevailing' Corbett CJ said: 
'At all events, a practice "generally prevailing" is one which is applied generally in the 
different offices of the Department in the assessment of taxpayers and in seeking to establish 
such a practice in regard to a particular aspect of tax assessment it would not be sufficient to 
show that the practice was applied inmerely one or two offices.Moreover, the word "practice" 
in this context, means "a habitual way or mode of acting" ... and consequently, in general, it 
would also not be sufficient to show that, in regard to an aspect of assessment, a certain 




He was critical of the approach of Berman J in the Special Court(33): 
'It seems to me, with respect, that what was stated by Berman J, as set forth above, places 
insufficient emphasis upon what is actually done in the different offices of the Department of 
Inland Revenue in the assessment of taxpayers.I also am of the·view that it may be 
misleading to suggest as a requisite personal knowledge and approval of the practice on the 
part of the Commissioner.Although in terms of s 2( 1) of the Act the Commissioner is the 
official responsible for carrying out the provisions of the Act, under s 3(1) the powers and 
duties thereby imposed upon him may be exercised or performed by him personally or by any 
officerengaged in carrying out the provisions of the Act 'under the control, direction or 
supervision of the Commissioner". 
Significantly, he added(34): 
'The factum probandum was whether in the assessment of taxpayers who had carriedon 
dividend-stripping operations there was a generally prevailing practice, in the sense described 
above, that dividend-stripping losses be allowed.The existence of such a practice could be 
established by showing that the Commissioner, or someone in the Department with the 
necessary authority, had issued a departmentaldirective to that effect and that this directive 
was being followed generally inthe assessment of taxpayers; or by showing that in the general 
process of assessment dividend-stripping losses were consistently allowed in a sufficient 
number of cases to lead to the inference that such a practice was authorized and generally 
prevailed.These are factual matters to be decided by the court; and they arenot matters in 
respect of which assistance may be derived from expert evidence as such.' 
He held that the taxpayer had failed to discharge the onus of showing that as atthe time of 
assessment there was a practice generally prevailing in terms of which the Commissioner 
allowed dividend-stripping losses.He continued(35): 
'In my opinion, [the taxpayer] failed to discharge this onus.The general impression created by 
the evidence is that there was a measure of uncertainty in the Department, or in certain 
sectors of the Department, about the general question ofthe taxation of dividend-stripping 
operations, but that at the same time there are indications that the policy was to disallow tax 
losses incurred by companies in this way.There is certainly not proof, in my view, of a 
consistent and generally prevailing practice to allow dividend-stripping losses.' 
Corbett CJ accordingly found that it had not been shown that the original assessment for the 
1981 year was made in accordance with a practice generally prevailing at the 
time.Consequently, the Commissioner was not precluded by proviso (iii)to s 79(1) from 
issuing a revised assessment for that year. 
In ITC 1495(36) evidence was given on behalf of the Commissioner by the Deputy Director 
of the Law Interpretation section of Inland Revenue, who testified that he knew of no practice 
prescribing that the provision for accrued leave was to be allowed as a deduction.He said that 
50 
recovery where many persons are affected by the same error and a right to recover might thus 
disrupt the conduct of Revenue business or even of government finances. 
In the case of Rose Smith & Co Ltd v CIR(39) the company held railway wagons under hire 
purchase agreements and used them for the purposes of its trade.The accounts showed a 
deduction for hire spread evenly over the period of the agreements,(the 'even-spread 
method').An alternative method of calculation, (the 'actuarial method'), would have resulted in 
greater deductions in the earlier years of the hire purchase agreements and lesser deductions 
in the later years.Shortly after the Special Commissioners had decided in another case that the 
'actuarial method' was allowable for tax purposes, the company claimed error or mistake 
relief on the grounds that it had mistakenly used the 'even-spread method'.The Revenue 
admitted that for the future the company was entitled to be assessed on the basis of the 
'actuarial method', but argued that as the practice generally prevailing at the time the 
company made its returns was the 'even-spread method', no relief was due for prior years. 
Evidence was given by an Inspector from Head Office who provided a copy of the 
instructions to local inspectors which specified that only the 'even-spread method' be used, 
and who stated that in his experience these instructions were generally followed.This was 
confirmed by the inspector dealing with the company.The Special Commissioners accepted 
this evidence, were satisfied that the practice generally prevailing had been the 'even-spread 
method', and refused the claim. 
The only other case in England in which the question of the practice generally prevailing 
reached the courts was Arranmore Investment Co Ltd v IRC( 40). 
In that case a land investment company had entered into transactions prima facieliable to tax 
under certain provisions now obsolete and its accountants had submitted computations relating 
to these transactions based on their understanding of the legislation.Assessments were raised 
accordingly, but after they had becomefinal and conclusive the Special Commissioners 
decided in a certain case that noliability attached to the type of transactions entered into by 
the company.The Revenue accepted this decision and acted upon it in similar cases.On 
hearing of this a s 33 claim was submitted by the company's accountants, but was refused by 
the Board on the grounds that the 'practice generally prevailing rule' preventedrelief. 
When the case came before the Special Commissioners evidence was given by an official 
from HM Chief Inspector of Taxes(Property) of his experience of assessments made under the 
relevant charging provisions.He produced a copy extract of the relevant instructions to local 
inspectors and stated that in his experience not only had those instructions been generally 
followed, such that before any inspector departed from them he would refer to the Chief 
Inspector for advice, but also there were many taxpayers who had accepted the liability 
negotiated at local level in accordance with the interpretation of the law reflected in those 
instructions.The local inspector dealing with the company gave evidence supportive of the 
assertions of his Head Office colleague. 
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guidelines were laid down only when a discretion had to be exercised.He also testified that 
there was nothing in the official Handbook dealing specifically with leave pay.Moreover, not 
all precedents quoted in it indicated a departmental practice.It and various circulars were 
intended for departmental use only and were not available to the general public. 
Melamet J found that the taxpayer had failed to prove that there was a 'practicegenerally 
prevailing' at the time when the original assessments were issued precluding the subsequent 
issue of the additional assessments. 
He observed that the words 'practice generally prevailing' do not have a technical meaning 
and must bear their ordinary grammatical meaningThe onus rested on the taxpayer to prove 
the existence of the practice at the time the disputed assessments were issued.It was required 
to show, on a balance of probabilities, thatsuch expenditure was routinely allowed by 
receivers of revenue throughout the country, with the Commissioner's knowledge and consent. 
In England, even though all the conditions and formalities for a valid claim fora refund of tax 
have been satisfied, no relief will be given 'in respect of an error or mistake as to the basis 
on which the liability ... ought to have been computed where the return was in fact made on the 
basis or in accordance with the practice generally prevailing at the time when the return was 
made.'(37) 
Interestingly, our s 102 dates the practice generally prevailing at the date of the assessment, 
whereas the English provision dates it at the time when the return was made. 
D Stopforth(38) comments: 
'This restriction[the proviso to s 33(2)] was apparently inserted to meet the type of case 
where a generally accepted practice, thought by the taxpayer and the Revenue to be in 
accordance with the law at the time of making the return, is later shown to be incorrect as a 
result of a decision in the courts or legal advice given to the Revenue.Although such a 
decision or advice might necessitate legislation to correct the position for the future, many 
taxpayers will have agreed their assessments on the basis of the previous view of the 
law.Because of this, it was decided in 1923 that taxpayers who had been assessed in 
accordance with the original practice, and whose assessments had become final and 
conclusive before the change of practice, should not be allowed to base error or mistake 
claimson what was subsequently shown to be their mistaken view of the law.' 
On the meaning of the words 'the practice generally prevailing' he writes(39): 
' .. .it appears there is a practice if there is an established way of dealing with a particular type 
of transaction, (as may be shown from Revenue instruction manuals), it prevails if it is most 
frequent, and it is general if it is widely used.' 
It is clear that this limitation appearing in both s l 02 and s 33(2) is designedto preclude 
51 
Given this evidence the Special Commissioners found 
'that there was a practice which prevailed generally during the relevant ... periods, namely, 
that. .. [in] instructions issued by the Chief Inspector of Taxes, [and that] the effect of that 
practice was the charging and acceptance of liabilityto tax in circumstances such as existed in 
the present appeals'.(41) 
An interesting aspect is the issue of practice notes by the Commissioner, especially where 
they reflect a changed view of the law.The question is whether that changed view is only 
effective from the day of the announcement.It would be normal to state that the revised 
practice only applies to assessments which have not become final and conclusive and say 
nothing about error or mistake relief.Reliefunder s 102 may be available in such 
circumstances. 
The Commissioner's discretion and appeal 
As has been seen, s 102 provides that the Commissioner may authorize a refund of any tax 
overpaid but it must be proved to HIS satisfaction that an amount in excess of that properly 
chargeable was paid.The exercise of his discretion has not been made subject to objection and 
appeal. 
There are many circumstances in which the Income Tax Act makes an issue depend on the 
opinion of the Commissioner. 
The words 'in the opinion of" are equivalent to the words 'the discretion of theCommissioner' 
or 'when the Commissioner is satisfied.' 
Silke states( 42): 
'It is trite law that when a matter is left to the discretion of an official, his decision, even if 
erroneous, cannot be interfered with, provided that he has applied his mind to the point and 
has exercised his discretion bona fide and his decision was not in conflict with statutory 
provisions or the decisions of competent courts of law.The Commissioner, in exercising a 
discretionary power under the Income Tax Act, may not deliberately disregard the provisions 
of a statute; neither may he ignore the law as laid down by a competent court of law.Such 
action on his part would constitute evidence that he had not applied his mind to the 
matter.These considerations apart, the Commissioner's discretion, bona fide and honestly 
exercised, is free and unfettered. 
And(43): 
'When he has exercised a discretionary power conferred upon him, the question is not 
whether he was right or wrong.The sole question is whether he has duly considered the 
matter.As long as there is no decision of a competent court to the contrary, he has not 
disregarded the provisions of a statute and his bona fides in the view he took of the matter 
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cannot be questioned, he is not only entitl.ed but bound to give effect to his opinion.' 
Section 102 falls within that category of discretionary power where the exercise of the 
Commissioner's discretion is not made subject to appeal but at the same time appeal has not 
been expressly excluded.The result of this is that the Commissioner's discretionary powers are 
subject to examination by the Special Court.However, in contrast to the position where a 
decision of the Commissioner is expressly, in terms of the Act, subject to objection and 
appeal and where there would flow a re-examination of the facts by the Special Court and a 
decision on those facts, in this case where the discretionary decision of the Commissioner is 
not expressly stated to be subject to objection and appeal, the taxpayer can object in terms of 
the general provisions of s 81 and, thereafter, appeal to the Special Court in terms of s 
83 ( 1 ).In such a case the appeal is in reality a review of the Commissioner's decision on the 
normal grounds of review(44). 
It must now be considered as being settled that the Special Court does have the jurisdiction to 
conduct a review of the exercise by the Commissioner of an administrative discretion. 
Meyerowitz and Spiro state(45): 
'The Special Court has power to review the exercise of the Commissioner's discretion.Having 
regard to the ratio of the cited decisions, it would seem that the taxpayer who wishes to take 
the Commissioner on review to the Special Court would, despite the fact that the discretion is 
not made subject to objection, have to follow the same procedure envisaged by objection and 
appeal in order to avoid the assessment becoming final and binding in terms of s 81(5), 
namely to lodge an objection within the time limit stipulated for objection setting out the 
ground for review and thereafter appealing should the objection not succeed.Where the 
taxpayer is not aware of the reasoning or motivation of the Commissioner in exercising his 
discretion(as may well happen) he may have to safeguard himself by contending for more 
than one possible ground of review.' 
Where a taxpayer wishes to bring review proceedings under s 102 before the Special Court, 
the approach would still have to be by way of the objection and appeal provisions in the 
Income Tax Act.However, in these circumstances, the taxpayer must be careful, when drafting 
his objection, to raise appropriate grounds for review.One cannot simply approach the Special 
Court by way of a conventional appeal. 
The grounds on which the court will review an exercise of an administrative discretion were 
described by Innes ACJ in Shidiack v Union Government(Minister of the Interior)(46): 
'There are circumstances in which interference would be possible and right.If for instance 
such an officer had acted mala fide or from ulterior and improper motives, if he had not 
applied his mind to the matter or exercised his discretion at all, or if he had disregarded the 
express provisions of the statute- in such cases the Court might grant relief.But it would be 
unable to interfere with a due and honest exercise of discretion, even if it considered the 
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decision inequitable or wrong.' 
It will immediately be seen that the taxpayer faces formidable hurdles when attacking the 
Commissioner's discretion as exercised in terms of s 102( 1 ). 
Once the Commissioner has duly and honestly considered and determined the matter entrusted 
to him, his decision is final and this means that no remedy lies on the merits and the 
correctness or equity of the decision cannot be questioned. 
The case of Crown Mines Ltd v CIR(47) well-illustrates these issues. 
The facts were that the taxpayer company, which had carried on the business of mining for 
gold, had been assessed for dividend tax under the provisions of ss 35 and 38 of Act 41 of 
1917 in respect of the years 1917 and 1918 and had paid the amounts of tax so assessed.In 
May 1920 the taxpayer, considering on further review of these assessments that they had been 
wrongly made, submitted a claim for refund to the Commissioner, requesting him to exercise, 
in favour of the company,the powers conferred on him by the then s 95 of the Act, the 
predecessor to s 102. 
The Commissioner, after discussion with the representatives of the taxpayer company, in the 
exercise of the discretion conferred on him by s 95, refused the application for the refund of 
the amounts paid. 
The taxpayer company then applied to the Witwatersrand Local Division of the Supreme 
Court for an order declaring that the assessments had been incorrectly made and requiring the 
Commissioner to exercise in its favour the powers of refund conferred on him. 
The Witwatersrand Local Division, while expressing the opinion that the sums paid were not 
properly chargeable under the Act, held that the terms of the section left the decision whether 
a refund should be made to the discretion of the Commissioner, whose decision, made after 
going honestly into the facts and hearing the arguments of the taxpayer, could not be 
interfered with by the court. 
The Appellate Division held, dismissing the appeal with costs, that the provisions of s 95 
clearly revealed that it was the intention of the legislature that such a case as the present, in 
which the taxpayer had accepted and paid the assessment and now contended that it had been 
wrong in law, should be left in the hands of the Commissioner, who was empowered to 
authorize a refund, but only if it was proved to his satisfaction that there had been a payment 
in excess of the amount properly chargeable; his judgment was to be the sole test and in the 
absence of any fraud or failure on his part to apply his mind to the point at issue, neither of 
which conditions was present in the instant case, his decision was final. 
Innes CJ(with whom De Villiers JA and Juta JA concurred) said: 
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'Now it is at the assessment stage that questions of liability would ordinarily arise, and the 
legislature contemplated that at that stage they should be settled.Elaborate provision is made 
for lodging objections to an assessment, for the settlement of disputes arising therefrom, and 
for an appeal in all questions of law to the Superior Courts ... And the position of a taxpayer, 
like the appellant company, who had failed timeously to raise an objection to the assessment, 
and who alleged an overpayment under a mistake of law, would" ordinarily be hopeless.For no 
remedy by way of condictio would be open to him.Whether such a remedy would lie under 
similar circumstances in respect of an overpayment made under a mistake of fact is a point 
on which it is unnecessary to express an opinion.'(48) 
The Chief Justice continued: 
'The dispute here relates to a question of law, and in the absence of such consideration as 
fraud, the taxpayer would, apart from section 95, be without remedy.It was in view of that 
position that the clause in question was inserted.And its terms clearly reveal the mind of the 
lawgiver.The intention was to leave such a case in the hands of the Commissioner; he is 
empowered to authorize a refund, but only if it is proved to his satisfaction that there has 
been a payment in excess of the amount properly chargeable.His judgment is to be the sole 
test.The language used is not intended to give effect to a legal right; and it is wholly 
inconsistent with the idea that the taxpayer is entitled to demand anything except that the 
Commissioner shall consider the case.Having considered it, his decision is final.'(49) 
, 
Innes CJ's statement that the language used in s l 02(formerly s 95) is not intended to give 
effect to a legal right and was wholly inconsistent with the idea that a taxpayer was entitled 
to demand anything except that the Commissioner should consider the case, goes to the heart 
of the taxpayer's disadvantage when seeking relief under s 102.It is submitted that the 
taxpayer's position is extremely weak in relation to the Commissioner's in the operation of the 
section as in drafting the legislation administrative considerations favourable to the 
Commissioner were allowed to dominate.The Crown Mines case clearly illustrates the 
unfairness of the position where a court, whether it be the Supreme Court, or the Special 
Court, comes to the conclusion that amounts paid by the taxpayer were not properly 
chargeable under the Act but is powerless to overthrow the Commissioner's decision because 
there is no express right of objection and appeal accorded to the taxpayer in terms of the 
section. 
It is submitted that s l 02 should be amended to provide expressly for a right of objection and 
appeal to the taxpayer so that the full impact of the relief superficially offered by the section 
can be put into effect. 
Innes CJ was of the view that the rule laid down in Shidiack's case governed the case and 
that the question of a refund 
'has been left by the statute to the judgment of the Commissioner, and that the Court cannot 
interfere with the result of a due expression of such judgment.'(50) 
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Innes CJ noted that the taxpayer's counsel 'strove hard to bring the case within the operation 
of such circumstances'.He said(51 ): 
'He[the Commissioner] has no right to authorize a refund until satisfied that there has been a 
payment "in excess of the amount properly chargeable under this Act"; he must, therefore, 
ascertain what that amount is- a process which necessarily involves an interpretation of the 
statute.Nor is there ground for holding that he disregarded any express provision of the Act; 
his attention was pointedly called to section 38, and even if he misinterpreted it, that would 
not prove that he disregarded it.I can find nothing to show that either in procedure or 
otherwise he disregarded any express statutory provision.' 
It was also argued that 'the facts were so clear that no reasonable man could doubt that there 
had been an excess payment of tax'.But the court was not prepared to say that the conclusion 
arrived at on that point was so unreasonable as to justify the inference that there had been no 
real exercise of judgment. 
In another case, CIR v City Deep Ltd(52), also an Appellate Division judgment, and also one 
dealing with refunds under s 95 of Act 41 of 1917, the taxpayer had applied for a refund and 
the application had been refused by the Commissioner.Thereupon, on a motion to the 
Transvaal Provincial Division, for an order compelling the Commissioner to review his 
decision, cancel the assessments and refund the tax paid, the taxpayer obtained an order 
referring the matter back to the Commissioner with a direction to exercise his discretion with 
due regard to the views expressed by the court as to the meaning and object of s 95. 
In accordance with this order the Commissioner reconsidered the application, but advised the 
company that he was not satisfied that the amounts paid by the company were in excess of 
the amounts properly chargeable under the Act, and was, therefore, unable to accede to the 
request for a refund. 
On receipt of this decision the company once more moved the Transvaal Provincial Division 
for an order in similar terms to that previously claimed, on the grounds that the Commissioner 
had disregarded the directions given in the order granted by the court and then obtained a 
mandatory order setting aside the assessments made and ordering a refund.The Commissioner 
appealed against this order. 
It was held, allowing the appeal, that1 the Commissioner's discretion under s 95 was free and 
unfettered and that so long as his exercise of that discretion was bona fide and his decision 
was not in conflict with statutory provisions or the decisions of competent courts of law, it 
was not subject to review. 
De Villiers JA said(53): 
'Undoubtedly the Commissioner could not disregard deliberately the provisions of a Statute 
any more than he could be allowed to ignore the law as laid down by a competent court of 
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law.To have done so, would, in the absence of explanation, be evidence that he had not 
applied his mind to the matter.But apart from that the Commissioner's discretion, bona fide 
and honestly exercised, was free and unfettered.He was not bound by the ruling of the Special 
Court, which, though a competent court to decide the issues between the parties, was not a 
Court of law.The question was not whether the Commissioner w~ right or wrong.The sole 
question was whether he had duly considered the matter.As there was no decision of a 
competent Court to the contrary and his bona fides in the view he took of the nature of the 
annual payment was not questioned, he was not only entitled but bound to give effect to his 
opinion.Any other course would be in direct conflict with the Statute casting the duty of 
decision upon him.' 
However, in ITC 1544(54), where the taxpayer claimed a refund in terms of s 102(1) of 
NRST paid in terms of s 42(1) of the Act, and the Commissioner had rejected the claim, the 
taxpayer successfully noted an appeal to the Transvaal Special Court for a refund. 
Interestingly, Melamet J approached the hearing as an 'appeal' and made no mention in his 
judgment of the fact that the matter was before him on review.He also made no mention of 
the ground of review that he was applying in the circumstances of the case.He merely set out 
the grounds of appeal.On appeal no evidence was led and the facts in the matter were not in 
dispute. 
At the conclusion of his judgment he states: 
'In the result the appeal succeeds and the Commissioner is ordered to refund to the appellant 
the amounts paid to him as NRST on behalf of the appellant during the period 8 October 
1987 to 30 January 1990.' 
However, once the Special Court has found that an administrative discretion was improperly 
exercised, the matter must be remitted to the Commissioner to enable him to exercise his 
discretion correctly.The court cannot, in these circumstances, substitute its own decision for 
that of the Commissioner. 
If a taxpayer wishes to bring review proceedings before the Special Court, he must ensure 
that one of the grounds of his objection clearly indicates that, to the extent that the assessment 
under objection is dependent upon the exercise of a discretionary power, such a decision is 
assailable on one or other of the usual review grounds. 
Melamet J's approach must be viewed in the light of the fact that withholding taxes are 
payable other than under assessment but, it is submitted, the Commissioner's discretion to 
refund in terms of s 102(1) would still be operative. 
The approach of the court in Stroud Riley & Co Ltd v SIR(55) accords with the procedures 
set out ins 102.In that case the Commissioner had satisfied himself that the amount of tax 
paid was in excess of the amounts properly chargeable under the Act. 
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Another feature of this case has been dealt with in The Taxpayer(56): 
'As a result of this decision[ITC 1544] numerous taxpayers are now applying for a refund of 
NRST in terms of section l 02(1) of the Act in so far as NRST has been paid within the last 
three years.Although section l 02(1) provides that no amount pai_d in respect of an assessment 
which has been accepted by a taxpayer and made in accordance with the practice generally 
prevailing at the date of that assessment shall be deemed to have been otherwise than properly 
so charged, withholding taxes are payable other than under assessment.Hence the defence of 
the proviso to section 102(1) is not open to the Revenue.Furthermore, it does not appear that 
the recent amendment of section 42(1) has been made retrospective.' 
It is quite correct that the proviso is limited to · an amount paid in respect of an assessment' 
and NRST is payable under the Act otherwise than under an assessment. 
The Taxpayer(57) makes a further interesting comment: 
'It could also be argued that as payment of NRST had been made under a mistake of law and 
not because of a practice generally prevailing, companies which wrongly paid NRST can 
recover the tax urider the common law remedy of the condictio indebiti, the Appellate 
Division in Willis Faber Enthoven(Pty)Ltd v Receiver of Revenue and another l 992(4)SA 
202(A) having recently held that a mistake of law was not a bar to this remedy.Having said 
all this, we understand that the Revenue Department is making refunds on application.' 
The relationship between the statutory provision, s I 02, and the common law, will be 
discussed in a later section.Suffice it to say that the operation of a statutory provision 
providing for a refund may supersede a taxpayer's common law remedy (cf the Woolwich 
Building Society case.). 
Lastly, mention must be made of s 3(2) which limits the period during which the 
Commissioner can withdraw or amend a discretionary decision to two years from the date of 
the written notification of such decision or of the notice of assessment giving effect thereto, if 
all the material facts were known to the officer when he made his decision. 
In terms of s I 02(2) a claim for a refund must be made within three years of the date of an 
assessment under which the tax was payable or, where the tax was chargeable and was 
payable other than under an assessment, the date of payment of the tax.Then, a taxpayer 
claiming a refund in those periods, must bear in mind that, he must note his objection within 
two years of receiving the Commissioner's notice of refusal of the claim, otherwise, in terms 
of s 3(2), it would no longer be competent for the Commissioner to further revise his original 
decision which has to stand. 
In England if the claim for a refund is valid, the formalities have been satisfied, and the 
return was not in accordance with the practice generally prevailing at the time it was made, 
the Board is required by s 33(2) of the Taxes Management Act to inquire into the matter and 
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give relief by repayment of such an amount as is reasonable and just.Relief is by repayment 
without adjustment of the excessive assessment, as no power is given in the section to alter an 
assessment which has become final and conclusive. 
In terms of s 81 ( 5) of our Act-
'Where no objections are made to any assessment or where objections have been allowed or 
withdrawn, such assessment or altered or reduced assessment, as the case may be, shall, 
subject to the right of appeal hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive.' 
It is submitted that s 102 does not interfere with the finality of assessments in the sense that 
in our law, as well, relief is by way of refund and there is no provision in the Act providing 
for an adjustment of an excessive assessment. 
Obligation of the Commissioner to act 
In Stroud Riley & Co Ltd v SIR(58) the court, having decided that the company was entitled 
to claim a refund of the NRST that had been overpaid, held(58): 
'It seems to me that in dealing with a matter of this nature the respondent[the Commissioner] 
is required firstly to enquire into the facts.If after such enquiry he is satisfied that the amount 
paid is in excess of the amount properly chargeable under the Income Tax Act, he is bound, 
as a matter of duty, to authorize the refund to the taxpayer.This seems to be the clear effect of 
the decisions quoted above.In the latter respect he has no discretion in the matter in spite of 
the use of the word · may' in the section which authorizes him to make a refund.' 
In dealing with a similar provision in the Australian legislation, it was held in Finance 
Facilities(Pty)Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation(59): 
'If the Commissioner, having considered the matter, is satisfied of facts out of which the 
power to allow the rebate arises, he cannot nevertheless refuse to allow it.' 
In the Stroud Riley case Cloete J continued(60): 
'In the present case the respondent[the Commissioner] has satisfied himself that the amount of 
tax paid was in excess of the amounts properly chargeable under the Act.The facts have 
therefore been established by him out of which his power to authorize a refund has been 
established and in terms of the authorities quoted above there now rests upon him a duty to 
authorize the refund.' 
In CIR v City Deep Ltd(61) De Villiers JA in dealing with s 95 of the Income Tax Act of 
1917, the predecessor of the present s 102(1 ), said: 
· Section 95 of the Income Tax Act of 1917 casts a duty upon the Commissioner to authorize 
58 
~- ~ - - .. 1lim" 
a refund to any taxpayer of any tax overpaid where it has been proved to his satisfaction that 
the amount paid is in excess of the amount properly chargeable under the Act.' 
He then said(62): 
'The sole question is whether the Commissioner has duly considered the matter.Now as there 
is no decision of a competent court of law to the contrary and the commissioner's bona fides 
in the view he takes of the nature of the annual payment is not questioned, he is not only 
entitled but bound to give effect to his opinion.Any other course would be in direct conflict 
with the Statute which casts upon him the duty of authorizing a refund only in the case where 
it has been proved to his satisfaction that the amount paid is in excess of the amount properly 
chargeable under the Act.And that disposes of the matter.' 
The provisions of s 102 empower the Commissioner to take action and, in fact, amount to a 
directive to take action. 
Assessed losses 
What happens if a taxpayer discovers that an assessed loss that he incurred in a particular 
year should have been a larger amount than that calculated by the Commissioner? 
Although s 102 authorizes a refund 'of any tax overpaid' and consequently does not appear to 
apply to an assessment that shows an assessed loss rather than an amount of tax due, the 
Commissioner does permit an assessed loss of an earlier year to be increased, even if no 
refund of tax is involved. 
The three-year limit would still apply in these circumstances, although the Commissioner has 
been known to grant a refund of tax overpaid on an assessment made within the three-year 
period as a result of the understatement of an assessed loss brought forward from earlier 
assessments.In other words, he has adjusted the balance of assessed loss brought forward to 
the first assessment in the three-year period to allow for errors made in assessments before the 
three-year period .. Silke states(63): 
'Since s 102(1) refers to a refund 'of any tax overpaid', it clearly provides for a situation in 
which a taxpayer actually paid tax.If a taxpayer had an assessed loss and consequently never 
paid tax in a particular year, it seems that s 102 cannot apply.' 
However, Silke then goes on to describe the Commissioner's practice. 
Interest 
A taxpayer is not entitled to interest on any overpayment refunded to him in terms of s 
102.Section 102 contains no provision for the payment of interest by the Commissioner on 
amounts refunded. 
59 
Interest is paid by Inland Revenue on a refund of tax resulting from the withdrawal of the 
Commissioner from a case prior to its being heard by the Special Court, that is, after an 
appeal has been lodged. 
Section 88 provides-
, ... but if any assessment is altered on appeal or in conformity with any such decision or a 
decision by the Commissioner to concede the appeal to the special court or such court of law 
a due adjustment shall be made, amounts paid in excess being refunded with interest at the 
prescribed rate, such interest being calculated from the date proved to the satisfaction of the 
Commissioner to be the date on which such excess was received .... ' 
It could be argued, however, that in circumstances where the taxpayer has paid interest on 
overdue payments in terms of s 89(2) and they are subsequently refunded by the 
Commissioner in terms of s 102, no interest would be paid on the tax refunded. 
Returns 
As has been seen, in England error or mistake relief is only given 'by reason of some error 
or mistake in a return'.Section I 02 accords relief if it is proved to the Commissioner's 
satisfaction that the taxpayer has paid an amount in excess of the amount properly chargeable 
under the Act. 
However, the importance of the return in determining error or mistake in South Africa must 
not be under-estimated. 
The statutory requirements for returns must also, then, be borne in mind. 
As is stated by Meyerowitz (64): 
'The medium through which the assessment, ie determination of the amount upon which 
income tax is leviable, is arrived at is the "return"'. 
He continues to observe that there is no definition of the term 'return' in the Income Tax Act 
and that 'return' must be distinguished from 'form of return' with which it is often confused.In 
s 66(1 )( a) the Act speaks of 'returns for the assessment of the tax' and frequently reference is 
made to the 'return of income' which must be 'full and true'. 
Meyerowitz(65) attempts his own definition of a 'return' in this way: 
'In the premises "return", it is considered, means the information required of, or given by, the 
taxpayer, as the case may be, which is necessary to enable the Commissioner to determine the 
income subject to tax for the year of assessment.'A return must be accompanied by all such 
balance sheets, trading accounts, profit-and-loss accounts and other accounts of whatever 
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nature as are necessary to support the information contained in _the return. 
Where there is an error or mistake in a return there will be a causal link between the return 
and the excessive assessment, and not merely some arithmetica~ error in the assessment. 
Other overpayment provisions in the Income Tax Act 
If a taxpayer's income for any tax year ending on or after 28 February 1983 consisted solely 
of 'remuneration' and he was not required to and did not render a return of income for that 
tax year he would not be entitled to a refund of any employees' tax deducted or withheld from 
his remuneration unless he lodged his claim for the refund within three years from the end of 
the relevant tax year. 
Even then, he would not be entitled to a refund unless the employees' tax deducted or 
withheld from his remuneration exceeded his actual liability for tax by at least R2.By the 
same token, the Commissioner is not allowed to recover tax underpaid by the taxpayer where 
his actual liability for tax falls short of the amount of employees' tax deducted or withheld 
from his remuneration unless the shortfall is at least RI0.(Section 102A) 
If in respect of any year of assessment the amount of employees' tax deducted or 
withheld(plus any provisional tax paid for that year plus any amount standing to the 
taxpayer's credit) exceeds the amount of his total liability for the taxes against which it is to 
be set off, the excess must be refunded to him.If there isa shortfall, the taxpayer must pay the 
excess as provided in the assessment notice.If an amount in excess of the amount due to the 
taxpayer is refunded, the Commissioner may recover the excess as if it were a tax and the 
excess must forthwith be repaid.(Paras 28(1) and 28(7) of the Fourth Schedule to the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962.) 
Should it emerge at the end of a tax period that an employee's net remuneration from his 
employer was subject only to SITE but the total employees' tax actually dedu£ted by the 
employer exceeds the SITE required to be deducted, the employer will be obliged to repay to 
the employee the excess of the employees' tax deducted by him over the SITE required to be 
deducted.He may then deduct the refund from any subsequent payment of employees' tax due 
by him to the local receiver of revenue, alternatively, it will be refunded to him by the local 
receiver. 
Should the amount of employees' tax deducted differ from the amount of SITE that ought to 
have been deducted by no more than 2%, it will be deemed to be correct and no adjustment 
need be made.(Paras l lB and 29 of the Fourth Schedule.) 
An employer is required to determine the annual tax (SITE) in accordance with the form 
setting out personal particulars or fresh form furnished by the employee.It can be seen that 
SITE is not refundable, in other words, a taxpayer will not receive a refund should the SITE 
amount exceed his assessed liability.This could happen, eg, where the employee has not 
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furnished his true personal particulars to his employer or is entitled to an exemption or 
deduction not taken into account in determining his remuneration for employees' tax. 
The Fourth Schedule uses the words-
'shall be deemed to be an amount of SITE correctly determined under those provisions.' 
In an article in the Taxpayer(66) it is stated: 
'Employees should furthermore be informed that the SITE determination which is done 
annually at the end of February or at the end of a tax period is also based on the particulars 
contained on the latest IRP 2 form submitted and that such SITE determination at the end of 
the tax year or tax period is final.The Receiver of Revenue may in certain circumstances, 
redetermine SITE but NOT WHEN AN EMPLOYEE HAS NEGLECTED TO SUBMIT OR 
UPDATE HIS PERSONAL PARTICULARS on the prescribed IRP 2 form in which case a 
refund of any possible tax overdeductions cannot be considered.' 
It has not been considered whether s 102, which authorizes a refund of amounts paid that are 
in excess of the amount properly chargeable, would be of application in these circumstances. 
It has been submitted(67) that an employee who has overpaid SITE will have resort to s 102 
in order to obtain a refund of his overpayment. 
It is submitted that the fact that SITE is deemed to be correctly determined under certain 
circumstances does not preclude the taxpayer from invoking s I 02.This situation must be 
contrasted with s 81 which provides that an assessment, under certain ·circumstances, will be 
final and conclusive, yet s 102 is operative. 
Section 102 refers to 'any tax overpaid' and 'tax' is defined in s 1 as any levy or tax leviable 
under the Act. 
Although para l lB of the Fourth Schedule contains no provision entitling a taxpayer who is 
liable solely to SITE to demand to be assessed to tax, it is submitted that s l 02(2) provides 
for the situation where tax is chargeable and payable under the Act otherwise than under an 
assessment. 
Although a SITE determination may be amended by the Commissioner only under the 
provisions of para l lB( 4), it is submitted that his discretionary power under s 102 is not 
thereby excluded. 
Finally, it is submitted that a taxpayer's rights under s 102 can only be excluded where the 
Act expressly so excludes its operation or the circumstances of the refund do not fall within 
the ambit of the Act. 
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Alternatively, under the common law, there may well now be relief for employees who have 
mistakenly or in error furnished the wrong particulars to their employer on form IRP 2.This 
can be submitted in the light of the recent Appellate Division decision of Willis Faber 
Enthoven(to be discussed further). 
It is also submitted that because an employer may be acting on behalf of an employee or 
representing him in relation to the Commissioner, this on its own would not preclude an 
employee from making an error or mistake claim under s 102 or under the common law. 
Section 102(2)- application to taxes 
Section 102(2), providing for taxes otherwise than under an assessment, includes 
* non resident shareholders' tax 
* withholding tax on royal ties and 'know-how' payments 
* donations tax 
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PART FOUR 
REFUND PROVISIONS IN OTHER FISCAL LEGISLATION - South Africa 
I.The Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 
Section 44 is the general provision dealing with refunds.The Commissioner, on 
application by the person concerned, is required to refund 
(a) any amount of tax, additional tax, penalty or interest paid by any person in terms 
of this Act to the Commissioner that was in excess of the amount of tax, additional 
tax, penalty or interest, as the case may be, that should properly have been charged 
under this Act; 
or 
(b) any amount refunded to a vendor in terms of subsection (I) was less than the 
amount properly refundable under that subsection. 
The Commissioner, in such circumstances -
'shall ... refund the amount of tax, additional tax, penalty or interest paid in excess or 
the amount by which the amount refunded was less than the amount properly 
refundable, as the case may be.' 
When the aggregate amount of input tax deductible by a vendor exceeds the amount 
of output tax that must be accounted for by him the excess is refundable to the 
vendor by Inland Revenue. (s 16(5) and 44(1)). 
A refund must be made if the amount actually refunded by Inland Revenue is less 
than that which should have been refunded. (s 44(2)(b)) 
If, however, a vendor has failed to pay any amount of tax, additional tax, penalty or 
interest due by him within the period prescribed for payment or owes any amount of 
tax, interest or penalty under ANY Act administered by Inland Revenue, e.g. income 
tax or transfer duty, then Inland Revenue is empowered to set off a VAT refund due 
to the vendor against any of the amounts referred to in the section that are 
outstanding (s 44(6)). 
Even though a refund may be due to a vendor in accordance with the provisions of 
the Act, Inland Revenue may refuse to make a refund where the claim for the refund 
is not made within five years after the end of the relevant tax period to which the 
refund relates (s 44(l)(i)) or where the amount to be refunded is Rl00 or less. 
When faced with a claim for a refund of any tax, penalty or interest paid in excess of 
the amount properly chargeable, Inland Revenue may, again, refuse to make the 
refund if the claim is not made within five years after the date on which payment of 
the tax, penalty or interest was made -
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'Provided that if the Commissioner is satisfied that such payment was made in 
accordance with the practice generally prevailing at the said date, no refund shall be 
made unless the claim for any refund is made within six months after that date .. .' 
Should Inland Revenue refuse to authorise a refund, it is required to give the vendor 
written notice accordingly, (s 44(8)). If the vendor is dissatisfied with this refusal, he 
may lodge an objection, (s 32(1 )(b )), and should it be disallowed, he may appeal to 
the specially constituted Board for hearing income tax appeals established by s 
83A(2) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 or, if appropriate, the Income Tax Special 
Court (s 33A and 33(i)). 
Section 44 contains several interesting features which are not present in s 102 of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962: 
*this provision gives a general right to recover tax not due which does not 
depend on the circumstances of payment. 
*The refund provision is not made subject to the discretion of the 
Commissioner; he must, on application by the person concerned, refund the 
excess. 
*The claim for a refund must be made within five years after the end of the 
relevant tax period. 
*Where the Commissioner is satisfied that payment was made in accordance 
with the practice generally prevailing, the period of five years is reduced to 
six months. 
*There is provision for set off of a VAT refund due to the vendor against any 
amount owing under any Act administered by Inland Revenue. 
*There is direct procedure for appeal on the merits of the refund - with none 
of the limitations of review procedure in S 102. 
*Where the vendor has failed to furnish a return for any tax period, the 
Commissioner may withhold payment of any amount refundable to him or any 
amount of interest on delayed refunds payable to him until he has furnished 
the return. 
*Where the Commissioner refuses to make or authorise a refund he must, at 
the request of the vendor concerned, give him written notice of such refusal. 
*Where the Commissioner does not refund within 21 business days after 
receipt of the vendor's return for a tax period, interest is payable on the 
refundable amount at the rate fixed for this purpose by the Minister of 
Finance from time to time by notice in the Gazette. 
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From the features of s 44 highlighted above, it is submitted that the section contains 
valuable provisions which could well be incorporated into a revised and redrafted S 
102 which would greatly benefit the taxpayer and, at the same time, not compromise 
or prejudice the Commissioner For Inland Revenue. 
2. Sales Tax Act 103 of 1978 
Although no longer in force, it is of interest to note certain features of the refund 
provisions in this legislation, for the purpose of this study. Here again the relevant 
section in the Act, s 32, gave the Commissioner a discretion to authorize a refund it 
was proved to his satisfaction that an amount of sales tax, penalty or interest paid by 
any person was in excess of the amount properly chargeable under the Act or sales 
tax had been borne by a purchaser or importer solely by reason of the fact that he, in 
circumstances where in the opinion of the Commissioner he acted in good faith, did 
not comply with the provisions of s 14(2). 
A person who was dissatisfied with the Commissioner's refusal to authorize a refund 
could, in terms of s 20(1 ), request that the matter be referred to a sales tax advisory 
committee for an opinion whether the refusal was justified. If he was dissatisfied 
with the opinion of the sales tax advisory committee about the correctness of the 
Commissioner's refusal to authorize a refund, he could lodge an objection in terms of 
s 21(1). 
The claim for a refund under s 32(1 )(a) had to be made within three years after the 
date upon which the payment of the amount claimed to be refundable was made. 
However, there wer~ two exceptions to this rule, one of which had the effect of 
extending this period in appropriate circumstances and the other could impose a more 
stringent time limit. 
The proviso to s 32(2)(a) prohibits the Commissioner from authorizing a refund of an 
amount that he is satisfied was paid in accordance with the practice generally 
prevailing at the date of the payment unless the claim for the refund was made within 
six months after that date. 
The learned authors of Juta's General Sales Tax Manual state at 1-162: 
'The determination whether a person has paid sales tax in excess of the amount 
properly chargeable or has borne tax that is refundable is within the discretion of the 
Commissioner. The Commissioner's discretion is free and unfettered. If the exercise 
of his discretion is bona fide and his decision is not in conflict with statutory 
provisions or the decisions of competent courts of law, it is not subject to review. 
Since the Special Court is not a court of law, the Commissioner is not bound to 
follow its decisions in exercising his discretion. Nevertheless, once the 
Commissioner has satisfied himself, as he is required to do, that an amount of tax has 
been paid in excess of the amount properly chargeable under the Act, he is obliged to 
authorize a refund.' 
Section 32 contains no provision for the payment of interest by the Commissioner on 
the amounts refunded in terms of the section. 
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Section 32 follows the format of s 102 of the Income Tax Act. 
The Sales Tax Act contained a system of taxation that relied very heavily on the 
discretion of the tax collector. Such a situation is not only potentially prejudicial to 
taxpayers or to some taxpayers but was also a danger for the·authorities themselves 
who would be swamped by the task of interpreting the law or, in the task of applying 
the law to individual taxpayers, may have lost sight of the principles underlying the 
law. 
Section 26A(c) was a most unusual provision to be found in a taxing Act. It 
effectively permitted the Commissioner for Inland Revenue to waive any amount of 
sales tax or any penalty or interest that would otherwise be payable by a person who 
genuinely believed he was exempt but, on applying to or as a result of an 
investigation by the Commissioner, discovered that the Commissioner did not share 
his view about the exemption. 
It was strange that an amount of tax properly payable should be waived (that is, if 
the Commissioner's view was correct.) Perhaps it was going too far to suggest that 
under s 26(A)(c) ignorance of the law was an excuse, but the provision favoured the 
taxpayer whose interpretative powers were weaker than those of a taxpayer who in 
the same circumstances would have paid the tax. 
A taxpayer would have been anxious to investigate the available provision for the 
refund of sales tax overpaid where he found himself without recourse to a sales tax 
advisory committee or to the Special Court for Hearing Income Tax Appeals because 
he could not manage to be served with a notice of intention to assess or a notice of 
assessment. It was a question that would also arise when, whether carelessly or in 
desperation, he had paid sales tax either in the normal course or in response to the 
irregular type of 'letter of demand' issued by the Department of Inland Revenue. 
The taxpayer's remedies in the Sales Tax Act were sadly deficient, especially in the 
case of the Department's practice, when it considered that sales. tax ought to have 
been paid in respect of a particular transaction, of sending the taxpayer concerned a 
demand for the tax and, very often, penalties as well. 
3.Stamp Duties Act 77 of 1968 
Section 32 provides, in so far as is relevant here: 
(1 )The Commissioner may make, or authorize to be made, a refund in respect of: 
(a)the amount of any overpayment of the duty or any penalty properly chargeable in 
respect of any instrument, if application for the refund is made within two years after 
the date of such overpayment: 
(b ) ... 
This section came into focus in the case of CIR v First National Industrial Bank Ltd 
1990(3)SA 641(A), 52 SATC 224. 
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Nienaber AJA (with whom Corbett CJ, Botha JA and Kumleben JA concurred) had 
occasion to examine the section and comment on its meaning and ambit. 
The following observations were made by the learned judge of appeal: 
*s 32(l)(a) contemplated a payment made in respect of duties rightly 
chargeable but wrongly calculated - to the extent of any excess there would be an 
'overpayment' and it would be an overpayment of duties 'properly chargeable'. 
*In the present case the payments were made by the bank and accepted by the 
Commissioner in respect of 'an instrument' which did not, in reality, attract 
duty at all; consequently this was not a case where the bank paid in excess of what 
it should have paid; this was a case where it should not have paid anything at 
all; hence there was no overpayment of duties 'properly chargeable' and s 32(1 )(a) 
accordingly did not apply. 
*s 32(l)(a) was not the sole and exclusive vehicle for claiming repayment in a 
case such as the present and the section did not, either in terms or context, 
purport to create a comprehensive remedy and hence the section was not 
conclusive of the entire issue - the fact that the section was silent on the 
question of interest did not mean that no interest was payable at all. 
*What S 32(l)(a) did was to empower the Commissioner, in particular 
circumstances, to make or approve a refund, but that did not mean that an 
aggrieved party was precluded from advancing a claim for repayment on a 
different basis, or that the section precluded a claim for more interest where the 
overpayment was legally recoverable at common law. 
These observations have an important bearing not only on the interpretation of S 
32(l)(a), but also on the relationship between the common law and statutory 
provisions, to be discussed later. 
This refund provision does not contain a discretionary power but empowers the 
Commissioner to make a refund in the specified circumstances. Its wording is also 
preferable to that of s 102. 
4.Transfer Duty Act 40 of 1949 
Section 20 provides: 
'If it is proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that duty has been paid in 
respect of an acquisition of property by a person who is or has become, in terms of 
this Act or any other law as in force on the date of the acquisition, exempt from the 
payment of duty in respect of that acquisition, or that the amount of duty which has 
been paid is in excess of the amount payable, he may authorise refund of the duty 
paid or of so much of the duty as has been overpaid, as the case may be.' 
This provision also accords with the traditional discretionary mode of refund clauses 
to be found in our fiscal legislation. 
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5.Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 
Sections 75-77 provide specific rebates, drawbacks and refunds of duty. 
They provide for the discretionary power of the Commissioner, in most instances, to 
grant a refund. Phrases such as 'the Commissioner may in his discretion investigate,' 
'Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act contained, the Commissioner 
may in his discretion and subject to such conditions ... as he may in each case 
impose,' and 'If the Commissioner is satisfied .. .' 
6.Estate Duty Act 45 of 19 5 5 
Estate Duty may be refunded to the executor or the person liable for the duty as a 
result of a successful appeal to the courts. 
However, an executor who has overpaid estate duty under a mistake of law and has 
not lodged an objection and appeal timeously as required by law appears to have no 
remedy and not to be entitled to a refund in terms of the Act. 
If, however, he has made an overpayment of estate duty as a result of a mistake of 
fact, for example, an incorrect calculation, he may claim a refund, but must lodge his 
claim within three years of the date of the overpayment, failing which the provisions 
of the Prescription Act will bar any claim. 
The recent Appellate Division decision of Willis Faber Enthoven may provide relief 
to an executor who has made an overpayment of estate duty under a mistake of law. 
There being no statutory provision for a refund in the Estate Duty Act, the executor 
would have no difficulty in proceeding under the common law. 
7. Regional Services Councils Act 109 of 1985 
Levypayers are entitled to claim a refund of any amount of levy or interest paid in 
excess of the amount legally payable. The application must be made in writing within 
two years after the date of the overpayment. 
The levypayer must be notified by the council in writing of a refusal to make a 
refund. There is no obligation on the council to furnish reasons for its refusal to 
make a refund. 
A council is entitled to allow the levypayer to offset an amount refundable against 
any levies due by him instead of making the refund in cash. 
No provision is made for the payment of interest on overpayments of the levies that 
are refunded. (Paras 12(1), (2), (3) and (4)). 
Relationship between statutory and common law. 
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I.Section 102(1) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 commences with the words: 
'If it is proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that any amount paid by a 
taxpayer was in excess of the amount properly chargeable under this Act, the 
Commissioner may authorise a refund to such taxpayer of any tax overpaid .. .' 
It further goes on to provide that: 'The Commissioner shall not authorize any refund 
under this section unless the claim therefor is made within three years after the date 
of the assessment under which such tax was payable .. .' 
2.The first issue to be determined is whether the statutory provisions which appear in 
most areas of the tax code relating to and regulating refunds of overpaid tax by 
Inland Revenue are of application in the given set of circumstances. 
3.The statutory provisions are primarily concerned with overpayment of tax pursuant 
to intra vires errors, such as excessive assessment. They may not be material to a 
case of ultra vires demand, that is, the case where there is simply no legal foundation 
for the demand at all. 
4.This distinction is well-illustrated in the South African case of CIR v First National 
Industrial Bank Ltd 1990 (3) SA 641 (A), 52 SATC 224 where the respondent had 
paid stamp duty on autocard transactions to the appellant under protest, since it 
contended that the duty was not payable. Each payment had been accompanied by a 
letter stating that payment was made under protest. 
5.The issue before the Appellate Division was the nature of the claim for repayment, 
for on this depended the bank's right to claim interest a tempore morae. 
6.The decision of the majority of the court (Nicholas AJA dissenting) was that the 
claim could not be one based on statute as the relevant section of the Stamp Duties 
Act referred to refunds for 'overpayments', which this was not, and therefore had to 
be either a condictio indebiti or a claim based on a contract between the parties, to 
the effect that if the amount paid was not in fact owing it would be refunded. 
7.As the wording of s 32(1 )(a) of the Stamp Duties Act 77 of 1968 is very similar to 
that of s 102 of the Income Tax Act, the observations on the meaning and ambit of 
that section by Nienaber AJA are very relevant. 
8.Nienaber AJA stated that whats 32(l)(a) contemplated was a payment made in 
respect of duties rightly chargeable but wrongly calculated. To the extent of any 
excess there would be an 'overpayment' and it would be an overpayment of duties 
'properly chargeable'. The taxpayer could then claim, and the Commissioner would 
be empowered to authorize, a repayment in terms of the section without recourse to 
the technicalities of a common law condictio. 
9.However, in this case, the court a quo found that the payments were made by the 
Bank and accepted by the Commissioner in respect of 'an instrument' which did not, 
in reality, attract duty at all. 
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1 0.This was not, therefore, a case where the bank paid in excess of what it should 
have paid; this was a case where it should not have paid anything at all. Hence there 
was no overpayment of duties 'properly chargeable'. Section 32{1)(a) accordingly did 
not apply. 
11.Nienaber AJA then went on to make the significant statement: 
'Section 32(1 )(a), moreover, is not the sole and exclusive vehicle for claiming 
repayment. The section does not, either in terms or context, purport to create a 
comprehensive remedy. What it does is to empower the Commissioner, in particular 
circumstances, to make or approve a refund. But that does not mean that an 
aggrieved party is precluded from advancing a claim for repayment on a different 
basis, or that the section precludes a claim for mora interest where the overpayment 
is legally recoverable at common law (at 231). 
12.It is clear from Nienaber's statement that it can be said that s 102 is also not the 
sole and exclusive vehicle for claiming repayment of overpaid tax. A taxpayer 
would, therefore, not be precluded from advancing a claim for repayment on a 
different basis. Moreover, there will also be circumstances not covered by s 102, as 
was the position in the First National Industrial Bank case, in relation to s 32{1){a). 
13.Hence, it is submitted, where the Commissioner makes a demand for tax where no 
tax at all is legally payable in the circumstances, there would have been no 
overpayment of tax 'properly chargeable' and s 102(1) would not be of application. 
14.Where s 102 is not of application at all, the legal relationship between the 
Commissioner and the taxpayer is an ordinary common law legal relationship flowing 
from unjust enrichment, contract or whatever. it is not a relationship created by any 
statutory provisions. 
15.It is also submitted that even in circumstances where a taxpayer can proceed in 
terms of s 102, he is not precluded from advancing a claim for repayment of 
overpaid taxes on a different basis. For example, the Taxpayer (November 1992) 
contends ( at 211) that where a payment of NRST has been made under a mistake of 
law and not because of a practice generally prevailing, companies which wrongly 
paid NRST could recover the tax under the common law remedy of the condictio 
indebiti, the Appellate Division in Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of 
Revenue 1992{4)SA 202{A) having recently held that a mistake of law was not a bar 
to this remedy. 
16.If a taxpayer has a choice of remedies for claiming a refund, it could be argued 
that he may be in a better position proceeding under the common law than in terms 
of s 102 (see the next section, The Common Law). 
17.In Crown Mines Ltd v CIR 1922 AD 91, 32 SATC 190, Innes CJ pointed out that 
speaking generally, assessment must precede payment and that the obligation to pay 
only arises upon a due assessment. An assessment must be determined before 
payment can be demanded from taxpayers. Whereas a taxpayer, who had failed 
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timeously to raise an objection to an assessment, and who had alleged an 
overpayment under a mistake of law, would ordinarily have been in a hopeless 
situation as no remedy by way of condictio would have ben open to him, he would 
nevertheless have obtained relief by means of s 102. However, with the Willis Faber 
Enthoven decision, a taxpayer would have relief at common law in addition to his 
statutory option under s 102. 
18.The reasoning of Innes CJ in the Crown Mines case, therefore, it is submitted, 
clearly accepts that a taxpayer may have more than one remedy when reclaiming 
payment of tax overpaid. 
19.Innes CJ also clearly acknowledged that the language used in s 102 is not 
intended to give effect to a legal right and said: 'it is wholly inconsistent with the 
idea that the taxpayer is entitled to demand anything except that the Commissioner 
shall consider the case (at 195). 
20.It is also submitted that the legislature, by enacting s 102, did not intend to 
remove from the taxpayer any legal right he may have had to reclaim payment of 
overpaid tax under the common law. If it had intended s 102 to be an exclusive or 
comprehensive remedy, it would have so provided in the section. 
21.In England, s 33 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 provides that 'if any person 
who has paid tax charged under an assessment alleges that the assessment was 
excessive by reason of some error or mistake in a return .. .' 
22.In Woolwich Building Society v IRC (No 2) [1992]3 All ER 737 it was held that 
s 33 was not of application in the circumstances of the case because 'the present case 
is not one in which an excessive assessment was made on a taxpayer, through some 
error of fact or law, as is contemplated by s 33(1 ). This is a case where there is no 
lawful basis whatever for any demand of tax to be made by the Revenue. In such 
circumstances, the demand itself is ultra vires and is therefore a nullity-. It follows 
that in a case such as the present there can be no valid assessment. No assessment 
was in fact raised on Woolwich in the present case, because the money alleged to be 
due by way of tax was paid, though under protest (at 757). 
23.It was pointed out thats 33(1) presupposed a lawful assessment which was 
excessive by reason by some error or mistake in a return. Where an assessment is 
alleged to have been made under ultra vires regulations the proper course would be 
to take proceedings by way of judicial review to quash the aberrant regulations and 
the assessment made thereunder. 
24.It was for these reasons that Woolwich was not enabled or required to seek its 
remedy through the statutory framework, but had to fall back on the common law. 
Lord Goff said: 
'It also follows that the common law principles, whatever they may be, are applicable 
to a case such as the present, unconstrained by the provisions of any statute' (at 757). 
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He conceded that statutory provisions creating a discretionary regime for the 
repayment of taxes or charges presuppose that the common law principles give no 
right of recovery and went on to state: ' ... but having, where applicable [i.e. statutory 
provisions], overlaid and replaced the common law principles, whatever those 
principles may be, they become neutral in their effect when the development of those 
principles is considered by the courts.' · 
25.As there is, as yet, no ground of restitution in England based on mistake of law, 
and, in any event, the circumstances in the case did not amount to an error of law on 
the part of the taxpayer, it was not necessary for the House of Lords to decide 
whether a taxpayer had a right to proceed under the common law as well as in terms 
of statute, should the statutory provision also be of application. 
26.It is submitted, however, that the wording of s 33(1) differs materially from that 
of s 102(1) in that it provides expressly for certain specific circumstances, i.e. 'If any 
person who has paid tax charged under an assessment ... 'Whereas s 102( 1) merely 
empowers the Commissioner, in particular circumstances, to make or approve a 
refund. it could be argued that the wording of s 33(1) precludes a taxpayer from 
advancing a claim for repayment on a different basis where the circumstances are 
covered by the section. 
27.In conclusion, it may be submitted that s 102 does not preclude the taxpayer's 
right to common law remedies, these being available to a taxpayer, in addition. 
28.It is submitted that a South African court faced with the facts in the Woolwich 
Building Society case could also have found that s 102(1) was not of application in 
the circumstances as the 'overpayment' had not been an overpayment of taxes 
'properly chargeable' as the Building Society was not obliged to pay anything at all. 
There had been no overpayment of taxes 'properly chargeable'. 
29.Although s 102(2), unlikes 33(1), does provide for refund of a tax which is 
chargeable and payable under the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 otherwise than under 
an assessment, the facts in the Woolwich Building Society case did not reflect a 
situation in which an excessive demand is made on a taxpayer through some error of 
fact and law as contemplated by s 102. Rather, the Woolwich Building Society case 
was one in which there was no lawful basis whatever for any demand of tax to be 
made by the Revenue. 
The Common Law 
In South African law the general requirements for liability for enrichment are: 
(a)the defendant must be enriched 
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(b)the plaintiff must be impoverished 
(c)the defendant's enrichment must be at the expense of the plaintiff and 
(d)the enrichment must be justified. 
Where one person's estate has been increased unjustifiably at the expense of another, 
then from the mere fact of such increase an obligation arises' in certain circumstances 
for the person enriched to restore the increase to the person at whose expense the 
increase has been taken. Hence enrichment itself is the source of the obligation. 
In Roman law this idea did not give rise to a general enrichment action, but it 
constituted the basis of a number of 'enrichment actions', particularly in the form of 
condictiones which have survived to the present day and are still applied in South 
African law. 
The best known of the condictiones is the condictio indebiti for the recovery of 
undue payment. 
It has been said that the object of the condictio indebiti is to recover money or other 
property transferred in intended payment of a non-existent debt ( 1) and that the 
requirements for its application are: 
*there must have been a datio of money 
*there must have been no legal or natural obligation to give it 
*transfer must have been give in the mistaken belief that the debt was due or 
involuntarily under duress or by a person of limited capacity to act. 
*the condictio indebiti lies where property has been transferred solvendi 
animoper errorem. Generally speaking the mistake must be one of fact and not 
of law (see on this aspect later). 
Professor W de Vos has described the condictio indebiti in Roman law in this way: 
. 'By this action a person claimed back a solutio indebiti, provided that he had made 
the payment per errorem facti and not as a result of an error iuris or as a result of an 
inexcusable error facti. Again, the action lay for the recovery of corporeal property 
plus fruits and accessions, but not for interest on money, or, where the property could 
not be returned, then for its value to the extent that the receiver was still enriched. 
There are even some texts allowing the condictio of the value of incorporeals, e.g. D. 
12.6.65.7 where the value of habitatio is condicted. That this was an enrichment 
action hardly needs pointing out.' 
The application of the condictio indebiti in situations where taxes or other dues have 
been paid to the State when there has been no legal obligation to pay them on the 
part of the payer, has as its starting point in our case law the case of Union 
Government (Minister of Finance) v Gowar (2) where Innes CJ stated: 
'It would be in the highest degree inequitable that the Treasury should be permitted 
to retain what it had no right to claim; and the question is whether the law will allow 
it to take up such a position ... It seems to me that money wrongly exacted by the 
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possessor of goods from the true owner as a condition precedent to their delivery, 
and paid by the latter not as gift, but in order to obtain possession of his own 
property and with a reservation of his rights would be recoverable by a condictio ... 
Where goods have been wrongly detained and where the owner has been driven to 
pay money in order to obtain possessi~n, and where he has done so not voluntarily, 
as by way of gift or compromise, but with an expressed reservation of his legal 
rights, payments so made can be recovered back, as having been exacted under 
duress of goods. The onus of showing that the payment had been made involuntarily 
and that there had been no abandonment of rights would, of course, be upon the 
person seeking to recover.' 
Wessels AAJA, in a concurring judgment stated (3): 
'I think we may well take the further step and hold that a payment is involuntary and, 
therefore, recoverable, even though it was not made metus causa in the Roman law 
sense, but was made under pressure at the demand of one in authority who had it in 
his power to withhold the property or to suspend the rights of the person making the 
payment.' 
It would therefore appear that the condictio indebiti is not confined to the recovery of 
an indebitum solutum which was involuntary because it was paid by mistake. It is 
now also available when the payment (or indeed any performance), although 
deliberate, perhaps even advised, was nevertheless involuntary because it was 
effected under pressure and. protest. 
In CIR v First National Industrial Bank Ltd (4) the Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
had insisted that the bank was liable for the payment of stamp duty in terms of s 3 of 
the Stamp Duties Act 77 of 1968 in respect of transactions with its customers on its 
autocard machines. The bank had contended that its autocard scheme did not attract 
stamp duty, but after an unfavourable ruling from the Registrar of Financial 
Institutions, and fearful of the possibility that penalties could be levied against it if it 
failed to pay the amounts demanded by the appellant timeously, it made a series of 
payments. Each payment was accompanied by a letter stating: 
'As we have not yet finalized this matter with the authorities, in order to avoid any 
penalty ... we hereby made payment, under protest, of stamp duty in respect of the ... 
debit entries to our Auto Card holders.' 
In spite of these facts Nienaber AJA concluded that the payments had not been made 
involuntarily and that there had not been 'duress of goods'. He was of the view that 
the bank had not been forced to pay but had decided to do so in order to avoid the 
possible imposition of penalties. 
It is submitted that Nienaber AJA's approach was a set-back for the taxpayer who is 
pressured by the Revenue 'armed with the coercive power of the state, including what 
is in practice a power to charge interest which is penal in its effect. (5) Force, or the 
threat of it against one's person or property should not be the only criteria for an 
involuntary payment. A taxpayer, in his relationship with the Revenue, is often 
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under severe pressure and coercion to pay and his rights are virtually non-existent 
unless he resorts to the courts, with all its uncertainties and attached risks. There 
was certainly pressure on the bank to pay and the same pressure would be prevalent 
on most taxpayers. 
In his minority judgment Nicholas AJA found that the facts of the case fitted the 
principle set out in Digest 12.6.2 that: 
'If a man pays on the understanding that if it should not prove to be due, ... the 
money should be returned, an action for the return will be in place, as there is a 
contract concluded between the parties .. .' 
Nicholas AJA also relied on the judgment of De Villiers AJA in the Union 
Government case (supra) in which, after a review of the Roman-Dutch authorities, De 
Villiers AJA had said (6): 
'If a person pays a debt not due knowingly and voluntarily, he is not able to recover. 
But if he pays under protest he is entitled to recover, for the protest is inconsistent 
with the idea of a gift or a compromise between the parties. The other party was not 
bound to accept money so paid, but if he accepts it he must be considered to have 
agreed that it should be recoverable if not due .. .' 
Where the Revenue makes an unlawful demand for tax and the taxpayer is convinced 
that the demand is unlawful and has to decide what to do, he is faced with the 
coercive power of the state together with its right to levy interest and penalties. In 
addition, where the taxpayer is a reputable financial institution it would 
understandably fear damage to its reputation if it does not pay. So it decides to pay 
first, asserting that it will challenge the lawfulness of the demand in litigation. Can it 
not be said that a taxpayer is acting under duress in these circumstances? 
It was precisely because the court in the First National Industrial Bank case was not 
able to find that the taxpayer had acted under duress in making payment that it found 
that the words 'under protest' had served as a basis for an agreement between he 
parties that repayment would be effected by the Commissioner should the issue be 
resolved in favour of the bank, and a new and independent cause of action had 
emerged from the agreement. 
Nienaber AJ therefore found that a contract for the repayment of the duty, if it 
proved not to have been payable, had been concluded between the parties, and that 
the probable basis for the contract had been their tacit agreement. He said (7): 
'Where, as in this case, a public official demands payment in terms of a statutory 
provision, and payment is thereupon effected "under protest" because the liability (or 
the sum) is disputed, it is more likely than not ... that it was tacitly understood 
between the parties that the sum so paid would be refunded if he official view should 
subsequently prove to be the wrong one; such would certainly have been the 
taxpayer's intention and since the official, bound as he is by the statute, would have 
had no statutory justification to retain what he should never have claimed, he can 
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scarcely have held a contrary view. In those circumstances one would be on safe 
ground, I think, in referring a tacit agreement between the parties along the lines 
suggested by counsel for the bank.' 
Nienaber AJA also said: 
'But there are other features supporting the contention of counsel for the Bank that it 
was in effect agreed between the parties, because the payments were made under 
protest, that the Commissioner would be obliged to repay the sums so paid should it 
be determined that the duties had never been due: thus the payments were made 
during the course of a continuing and genuine debate between them about the correct 
interpretation of the statute governing such payments; the Commissioner, who 
insisted on payment in accordance with his own view, consequently knew that the 
phrase 'under protest' accompanying each payment was not just an empty gesture; the 
Commissioner was the public official entrusted with the administration of that very 
statue (S 2(1 )); since he derived his authority from the statute itself, it follows that if 
his reading of it should prove to be wrong, he would not be empowered to retain, 
and hence would be obliged to refund, what was wrongly paid to him.' 
The last part of the above quotation is of the utmost importance to the rights of a 
taxpayer when seeking a refund of taxes overpaid; i.e. if the Commissioner's reading 
of a fiscal statute proves to be wrong, then he would not be empowered to retain and 
hence WOULD BE OBLIGED TO REFUND WHAT WAS WRONGLY PAID TO 
ffiM. 
This understanding of the law by Nienaber AJA is in itself a great advance on the 
common law position in England before the House of Lords stepped in to protect the 
taxpayer in the Woolwich Building Society case. 
It is submitted that Nienaber AJA's reasoning is, in essence, an application of the 
payment under duress procedure provided for in the condictio indebiti. 
A further important feature of this case is that the Appellate Division confirmed that 
the Commissioner was the authority to whom payment had to be made and, once the 
other requirements of the condictio indebiti had been satisfied, he was the obvious 
party from whom payment had to be recovered, whatever the ultimate administrative 
destination of the payments might be. It was not, in the opinion of the court, 
legitimate to differentiate for this purpose between various functionaries and 
departments of State. in other words, the condictio indebiti lay against the 
Commissioner once all the other requirements had been satisfied. 
The court also held that to be in mora there must be a debt and the debt must be 
forceable. The Commissioner could not be in mora as regards repayment until such 
time as it was decided that a duty to repay existed. That was the very point of their 
understanding, i.e. that the money would only be refundable once it had been 
established (by a tribunal or by compromise) that the Commissioner had 
misconstrued the statute and was obliged to repay the money. The Commissioner was 
not in mora and so could not be liable for interest a tempore morae. 
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The court was accordingly of the view that no interest was recoverable by the bank 
from the Commissioner prior to the decision of the court a quo that no stamp duties 
were payable. Only then would interest become payable. 
It is submitted that the First National Industrial Bank case is .a milestone decision for 
the rights of taxpayers when claiming a refund for taxes overpaid. It is only a great 
pity that the circumstances of the case were not felt appropriate by the Appellate 
Division for inclusion within the conductio indebiti. 
A taxpayer will only truly obtain a clear right in these circumstances when our 
Appellate Division recognises a general enrichment action in our law. These 
sentiments have been well~expressed by D H van Zyl (9): 
'The time has indeed arrived to give full recognition to a general enrichment action in 
South African law ... I believe there is a very real need for this action alongside the 
classical enrichment actions, which need not disappear since they have developed 
over a long period of time and doubtless still have a useful role to play.' 
Another landmark decision recently handed down was that in Willis Faber Enthoven 
(Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue and Another (10) where the appellate Division dealt 
with the question whether money paid in error of law was recoverable. 
In the court a quo the trial Judge regarded himself bound by the decisions of the Full 
Court of the erstwhile South African Republic in Rooth v The State (11) and of the 
Appellate Division in Benning v Union Government (Minister of Finance) (12) to the 
effect that such an error was as a rule a bar to the condictio indebiti. 
In this case both Willis Faber and Robert Enthoven paid the tax because they 
laboured under the mistaken impression that they were legally obliged to do so. 
There was no misconception of any fact and the mistake was purely one of law. 
What had to be considered was therefore, firstly, whether a mistake of law was 
indeed as a rule of bar to the condictio and, if not, secondly, whether the appellant 
was in the circumstances of the case entitled to recover the amounts paid. 
Refer JA said (13): 
'What is immediately apparent is that there is no logic in the distinction between 
mistakes of fact ant mistakes of law in the context of the condictio indebiti. This 
condictio has since Roman times always been regarded as a remedy ex acquo et bona 
to prevent one person being unjustifiably enriched at the expense of another. (Even 
those favouring the distinction concede that this is so.) Bearing in mind that the 
remedy lies in respect of the payment of an indebitum (i.e. a payment, without any 
underlying civil or natural obligation), it is clear that, where such a payment is made 
in error, it matters not whether the error is one of fact or of law: in either case it 
remains the payment of an indebitum and, if not repaid, the receiver remains 
enriched. the nature of the error thus has no bearing either on the indebitum or on 
the enrichment. The same result is achieved when the condictio indebiti is viewed (as 
it often is) as one of the condictiones sine causa. Again it matters not whether the 
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error is one of fact or law for in both cases the payment is made sine causa .. .' 
Refer JA continued (14): 
'Considered as a matter of simple justice between man and man, there is no 
conceivable reason why the receiver of money paid in error of fact should in the eyes 
of the law be in a better position than one who has received money paid in error of 
law.' 
The court noted that there was no evidence of a general application of the ignorantia 
juris rule in South African civil law. On the contrary, there were many cases in 
which it was not applied. The law relating to the renunciation of rights was a good 
example. As early as 1891 De Villiers CJ said in Watson v Burchell (15) that 
'no doctrine is better settled in our law than that a person cannot be held to have 
renounced his legal rights by acquiescence unless it is clear that he had full 
knowledge of his rights and intended to part with them.' 
On the question of legal policy Refer JA said (16): 
'But the administration of law suffered no ill effects as a result of the decision in De 
Blom's case; and it cannot seriously be suggested that it would if the distinction 
between errors of law and fact were to be abolished for purposes of the condictio 
indebiti, which affects no one but the payer and payee. Nor can legal policy stand in 
the way of its abolition; on the contrary, legal policy would seem to demand rather 
than preclude the abolition of a principle that is manifestly unjust in the majority of 
cases. Taking account further of the complexities of contemporary legal and 
commercial practices which differ toto caelo from those followed in earlier times, I 
would accordingly rule that the fact that money was unduly paid in error of law is 
not by itself a bar to its recovery by way of the condictio indebiti.' 
Accordingly, the Appellate division was of the view that our law was to be adopted 
in such a manner as to allow no distinction to be drawn in the application of the 
condictio indebiti between mistake in law (error juris) and mistake of fact (error 
facti). It followed that an indebitum paid as a result of a mistake of law may be 
recovered provided that the mistake is found to be excusable in the circumstances of 
the particular case. 
However, the court was not prepared to define the circumstances in which an error of 
law could be said to be excusable or, conversely, to supply a compendium of 
instances where it is not. 
Refer JA said (17): 
'All that need be said is that, if the payer's conduct is so slack that he does not in the 
court's view deserve the protection of the law, he should, as a matter of policy, not 
receive it. There can obviously be no rule of thumb; conduct regarded inexcusably 
slack in one case need not necessarily be so regarded in others, and vice versa. 
Much will depend on the relationship between the parties; on the conduct of the 
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defendant who may or may not have been aware that there was no debitum and 
whose conduct may or may not have contributed to the plaintiffs decision to pay; 
and on the plaintiffs state of mind and the culpability of his ignorance in making the 
payment. (Consider, for example, the case of person who, w~ilst in doubt as to 
whether money is legally due, pays it not caring whether it is and without bothering 
to find out.) There are only a few considerations that come to mind; others will no 
doubt manifest themselves with the passage of time as claims for the recovery of 
money paid in error of law come before the courts.' 
' 
What finally remained to be examined by the court was the excusabili~ of the error 
in the present case. In this regard Hefer JA summarised the evidence as follows 
(18): 
'I have no doubt that the error on Robert Enthoven's part was excusable. The 
company was faced with exhibit A. Initially the directives therein were followed and 
when Vaux questioned their validity he was assured that the tax was indeed payable. 
He cannot be blamed for turning to, for accepting the ruling of, the official to whom 
the administration of the Act has been entrusted and to whom members of the public 
would naturally turn for guidance. As Vaux said in his evidence, he accepted the 
Registrar's view as the most authoritative. It was not a view that could be dismissed 
as patently wrong; respondent's counsel supported it with confidence and great 
conviction even in this court. Moreover, the Registrar's view was not only shared by 
the Receiver of Revenue, but accepted and acted upon without demur for many years 
by every broker registered to do Lloyds' business. Bearing in mind that failure to 
pay the tax carries a criminal sanction, it comes as no surprise that Robert Enthoven 
followed suit. It is idle to suggest that it could and should have been paid under 
protest - an expedient usually resorted to when a person is confronted with a demand 
for money that he believes not to be due. This is not what Vaux believed.' 
The important aspects of the evidence revealed: 
*because the taxpayer found the provisions of the Act to be unclear, its 
financial manager, Vaux, at one stage telephoned the Registrar's office and 
enquired whether the tax was payable. 
*the taxpayer continued paying the tax since he was reasonably satisfied that 
it was payable 'after having cleared the matter up with the Registrar.' 
*Initially the taxpayer followed the necessary directives and when he 
· questioned their validity, he was assured that the tax was indeed payable. 
*the Registrar's view was not only shared by the Receiver of Revenue, but 
was accepted and acted upon for many years by every broker registered to do 
Lloyds business. 
The Appellate Division was, therefore, of the view that the taxpayer deserved the 
protection of the law in these circumstances. 
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The following requirements for establishing excusability of the error may be 
ascertained: 
*evidence disclosing the source of the error 
*evidence of enquiries made or other steps taken to· explore the position and 
ascertain the extent of the company's liability. 
*evidence of how the belief came to be entertained and what steps were taken 
to verify it. 
D P Visser (19) made the following observations on the excusability of error 
requirement: 
'Could it not be said that our highest court opted for excusability of error in order 
that it might serve as a vehicle through which policy considerations may be 
introduced to control the limits of liability under the condictio indebiti? If this were 
so, I would have no quarrel with the basic sentiment underlying such an approach. I 
would only say that the element of excusability is a very artificial and limiting way 
of achieving this perfectly defensible goal. It is, after all, clear that the difference 
between the judgment of the majority (who decided that in cases the error - at least 
in so far as the former Robert Enthoven & Co was concerned - was excusable) and 
the dissenting judgment of Van den Reever JA (who held that it was not) can 
ultimately be explained by a difference in policy regarding the relative rights of the 
state vis-a-vis the individual. Why not rather state openly that in all enrichment 
actions the retention will only be classified as sine causa if there are no policy 
considerations which militate against such a conclusion? This would pave the way for 
open debate about the factors which should determine the ambit of liability for 
unjustified enrichment and so contribute to a properly justifiable development of this 
part of our law. Perhaps the acknowledgement of a general enrichment action at 
some future date could serve as an appropriate time to give renewed attention to the 
problem canvassed here. I hope that will be the case, and then, perhaps, the dispute 
about error will be finally settled in our law.' 
D P Visser (20) also dealt with the consequences of the Willis Faber Enthoven case 
on taxation practice in this way: 
'The fact is that the bar to recovery of payments made under a mistake of law has 
had the (unintended) result of effectively shielding taxing authorities from having to 
repay wrongly paid taxes, for such payments are more often than not the result of 
some mistake in the interpretation of the law. No doubt Refer JA is correct, for the 
great majority of cases, when he says that the condictio indebiti 'affects no one but 
the payer and payee', but when the payee is the Receiver of Revenue (or some other 
taxing authority) this does not hold true. Whenever a court reinterprets a tax 
provision, anyone who has made a mistaken payment under the earlier interpretation 
will in principle (in so far as he or she is not barred by the rules of prescription and 
the error is 'excusable') be able to reclaim such payment.' 
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Visser also predicts that the legislature will seek to nullify the effect of the Willis 
Faber decision so far as it impinges on taxation. He adds (2): 
'One hopes, however, that the Government will in this instance show restraint and not 
rush into legislation which will cause unnecessary hardship to the individual, possibly 
without any real benefit to the treasury. After all, the court qualified the right to 
reclaim a payment made in error of law by imposing the same restriction as that on 
the right to recover payments made under an error of fact: the error has to be 
reasonable. That means that after a court has reinterpreted a tax provision, each 
person who would want to rely on the new interpretation to recover his or her 
mistaken payment will have to show that his or her mistake was reasonable.' 
On the effect of the Willis Faber judgment Visser states (21): 
'First, the fact that it allows a whole new class of claim to be brought before the 
courts inevitably raises the question whether it will affect the administration of 
justice by producing an unmanageable flood of cases. It is indisputable that 
erroneous payments stem from an error of law in a large variety of instances - not 
the least of which is the payment of tax and now the recovery of all such payments 
may be sought before the courts. The Appellate Division was, however, convinced 
that the decision in the present case would not adversely affect the administration of 
justice. And rightly so. After all, the number of instances in which a factual error 
will lead to a mistaken payment is infinitely greater than that in which an error of 
law will do so, and the courts have always dealt comfortably with undue payment 
cases resulting from factual errors.' 
Visser remarks (22) that the judgment might have an effect on the management of 
the state's coffers, for in each case where the accepted interpretation of a tax statute 
is overturned, those who have paid in reliance on its correctness will be able to bring 
an action for the return of that payment. 
The inconvenience that this might occasion could persuade the government to 
· neutralize this decision by legislative changes to the tax law. Visser. (23) warns, 
however, that to take such a course would be an overreaction, quite apart from the 
fact that it would represent an unacceptable disregard for the rights of the individual. 
In terms of the judgment, each claimant will have to prove that his or her error was 
'reasonable', and this requirement alone should have the effect of limiting mass 
repayments by the Receiver of Revenue. 
In her minority judgment Van den Reever JA takes up a harsh attitude to the 
individual vis-a-vis the state by stating (24): 
'The citizen in his relationship with the State, though no longer expected to be legally 
omniscient.has a duty to acquaint himself with the various laws or regulations 
applicable to the particular occupation in which he engages.' 
She also said (25): 
'We are not dealing with a situation where the mistake relied on is one affecting only 
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the rights of individual immediate parties to a relationship. What is in issue is the 
interpretation of a statute. One of the parties is the State, not in a one-to-one say, for 
example, contractual relationship with appellant, but the State in its more customary, 
authoritarian guise applying a general law. The matter accordingly has a far more 
general dimension and affects both the State itself and large numbers of others who 
arrange or have arranged their affairs on a certain view of that law.' 
The Willis Faber case undoubtedly ushers in a new dimension to the rights of the 
taxpayer vis-a-vis the Receiver of Revenue and the full impact of the decision is still 
to be seen. It is to be hoped that the legislature will not nullify the effects of the 
decision. 
The argument is made that a rule which allows recovery, whether based on mistake 
of law or the ultra vires nature of the levy, might lead to serious disruption of public 
finances. When a large number of payments must be returned, the expenditure has to 
be recouped by the authority, either by raising more revenue in a different manner, or 
by cutting expenditure in the future. On balance, however, in the majority of cases, 
it will be fairer to allow recovery than to refuses it. 
One way of dealing with disruption to public finances might be discriminating 
between different types of invalid decisions. Both in England and South Africa there 
is a statutory limiting provision that no amount paid in respect of an assessment 
accepted by the taxpayer and made in accordance with the practice generally 
prevailing at the date of that assessment shall be deemed to have been otherwise than 
properly so chargeable. To the extent that such provisions preclude recovery where 
there has been a change in the understanding of the law because of a judicial 
decision, the question arises whether an action based on mistake of law should be 
excluded in these circumstances. The question to be posed is whether the 'general 
practice' restriction should apply where the Revenue is demonstrably wrong in its 
interpretation. 
The statutory limitation was inserted to meet the type of case where a generally 
accepted practice, thought by the taxpayer and the Revenue to be in accordance with 
the law at the time of making the return, is later shown to be incorrect as result of a 
decision in the courts or legal advice given to the Revenue. 
It is submitted that a taxpayer, proceeding by way of the common law, should not be 
limited by a 'general practice' restriction. 
Rulings made by the Commissioner for Inland Revenue 'personally' are governed by 
s 3(3) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. This provision provides that: 
'Any written decision made by the Commissioner personally in the exercise of any 
discretionary power under the provisions of this Act or of any previous Income Tax 
Act shall not be withdrawn or amended by the Commissioner if all the material facts 
were known to him when he made his decision.' 




There is also doubt whether a ruling issued by the Commissioner or his officers on a 
general non-discretionary matter has any legal standing at all, for the Income Tax Act 
does not deal specifically with the effect of these rulin$S. 
On 1 March 1985 the Commissioner for Inland Revenue instituted a new policy by 
publishing Practice Note 1, dealing with deemed dividends. 
Those Practice Notes have no legal validity and are not binding on either the 
authorities or the taxpayer through any specific provision of the Acts, other than to 
the extent that they may be construed as representing a decision made by the 
authorities in he exercise of a discretionary power (in which event they will be 
governed by the limitations imposed on the tax authorities) or to the extent that they 
may represent a 'practice generally prevailing.' 
Various provisions enable the Minister of Finance to issue regulations, notices and 
schedules; 
Over the years Inland Revenue has compiled its own 'Income Tax Assessing 
Handbook' purely for internal use, to provide guidance to the Revenue staff and to 
achieve consistency in practices within the various revenue offices. 
Hence, the Practice Notes, the regulations and the Revenue Handbook constitute 
existing guides as to what a 'practice generally prevailing' might be. 
It is submitted that an error of law or misconstruction of a statute may occur in any. 
of these guides and in terms of the Willis Faber Enthoven decision, a taxpayer may 
proceed under the common law enrichment action alleging mistake of law in any of 
these sources. 
The Margo Commission (26) recommended that the protection afforded a taxpayer 
against error by the Commissioner, in the exercise of his discretionary powers, should 
be strengthened by a reduction in the number of discretionary powers that are not 
subject to objection and appeal. Those powers relating to tax liability should be 
made subject to objection and appeal. 
The Commission also recommended: 
*That the Commissioner should continue to lay down guidelines for the 
exercise of discretionary powers by receivers of revenue to ensure the greatest 
degree of uniformity. 
*Greater use should be made by the Commissioner of the practice of issuing 
information bulletins (practice notes), setting out the guidelines he usually 
follows in the exercise of his discretionary powers. 
*The Commissioner should be required to advise individual taxpayers how the 
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taxable income has been determined. 
*The Commissioner should establish a manual containing the regulations 
published by him from time to time. They would set out the interpretation that he 
accords to various provisions of the Act. He would be .bound by them, but the 
taxpayer would be at liberty to challenge any of them." 
A number of problems concerning specific and general rulings issued by the tax 
authorities have been identified. The potential exists for rulings to be inconsistent; 
the legal status of rulings is not clear; the legal redress of taxpayers against 
unfavourable rulings is often severely restricted; there is a general shortage of 
information available on what constitutes a generally prevailing practice; no 
comprehensive set of regulations on the Act is available to taxpayers; and tax 
authorities are frequently reluctant to issue rulings. 
The source of an error of law may therefore be found in a ruling, regulation or 
practice note issued by the Commissioner for Inland Revenue. 
In the Willis Faber Enthoven case the facts were that Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) 
Ltd, a company formed at the end of 1985 by the merger of two separate companies 
trading as insurance brokers, instituted action for the recovery of certain payments to 
the Receiver of Revenue mistakenly made by the two companies prior to the merger. 
These payments were made in the following circumstances: 
Section 60 (1 )(t) of the Insurance Act 27 of 1943 stipulated that anyone carrying on 
insurance business of a specified kind must pay a tax of 'two and a half per cent of 
the aggregate of all premiums paid during the preceding calendar year on policies 
which were effected through his agency in terms of this section.' From a reading of s 
60 as a whole it was quite clear that insurance business 'underwritten by underwriters 
at Lloyds' (Lloyds business') fell within the purview of the tax ciause. Less certain, 
however, was whether business placed outside the Lloyd's market, but effected or 
renewed through a broker at Lloyd's ('other business'), was also targeted by s 
60(1)(£). 
The problem was that the words 'this section' in s 60(1 )(f) could be read to refer 
either merely to s 60(1) (in which case Lloyds business only would have been meant) 
or to the entire s 60 (i.e. including s 60(2)), which would have had the effect that 
other business would have fallen within the ambit of the clause as well. 
When the one-time financial manager of Robert Enthoven & Co (Pty) Ltd (one of the 
pre-1985 companies) took up his post at that company, he found a directive from the 
Registrar of Insurance which stated that tax must be paid on both Lloyds and other 
business. He had misgivings and telephoned the Registrar's office to check that the 
tax was indeed payable on other business. The assistant registrar to whom he spoke 
merely referred him to the abovementioned directive. He then accepted the position 
as stated in the directive as authoritative and went on paying the tax. 
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After the merger the matter was taken up again and this resulted in the ensuing 
action. in the court a quo it was held that the tax payments in respect of other 
business were in fact not due, but that they were not recoverable on the basis that 
they were paid under a mistake of law. On appeal it was confirmed that other 
business fell outside the provisions of s 60(1 )(f), but the ruling of the court a quo 
(based on the authority of Rooth's and Benning's cases) in regard to the non-
recoverability of money paid in error of law was overturned, subject to the important 
qualification that the error must be excusable. 
The Appellate Division, in interpreting s 60, referred to the principle that an onerous 
provision reasonably capable of different constructions, should be construed in favour 
of the subject, citing two tax cases, Israelsohn v CIR (27) and Glen Anil 
Development Corporation Ltd v SIR (28). A taxpayer may now challenge the legal 
validity of a ruling or practice note, after having paid the tax claimed in terms of that 
ruling or practice note. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
1. That in South Africa a taxpayer who has overpaid tax and seeks a refund may proceed 
for such a refund under s 102 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 but this section by no 
means affords a taxpayer a clear right to a refund-
* the determination whether a taxpayer has paid an amount in excess of the amount 
properly chargeable is within the discretion of the Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue and such discretion has not been made subject to objection and appeal, 
although objection and appeal has not been expressly excluded by the section. 
* the Commissioner for Inland Revenue is empowered to authorize a refund only if 
it is proved to his satisfaction that there has l,een a payment in excess of the 
amount properly chargeable. 
* the section does not give effect to a legal right on the part of the taxpayer- it is 
wholly inconsistent with the idea that the taxpayer is entitled to demand anything, 
except that the Commissioner shall consider the case, having considered it his 
decision is final. 
* the section only contemplates a payment made in respect of taxes rightly 
chargeable but wrongly calculated- to the extent of any excess there would be an 
'overpayment' and it would be an overpayment of duties 'properly chargeable'. 
* where no taxes are due at all, ie the taxpayer should not have paid anything at 
all, there is no overpayment of taxes 'properly chargeable' and s 102 would not 
apply. 
* s 102 does not, either in terms or context, purport to create a comprehensive 
remedy- it merely empowers the Commissioner, in particular circumstances, to 
make or approve a refund. 
* an aggrieved party is not precluded from advancing a claim for repayment on a 
different basis and the section does not preclude a claim for mora interest where 
the overpayment is legally recoverable at common law. 
* s 102 is not applicable where there is no lawful basis whatever for any demand 
of tax to be made by the Revenue; in such circumstances the demand itself is ultra 
vires and is therefore a nullity; in such a case there can be no valid assessment. 
2. That in circumstances where s 102 is not applicable a taxpayer is not enabled or 
required to seek its remedy through the statutory framework but must fall back on the 
common law.Common law principles, whatever they may be, would then be applicable, 
unconstrained by the provisions of any statute. 
3. That statutory provisions creating a discretionary regime for the repayment of taxes or 
charges do NOT presuppose that the common law principles give no right to recovery. 
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4. That statutory provisions, although they may have overlaid and replaced the common 
law principles, whatever those principles may have been, they become neutral in their 
effect, when the development of common law principles are considered by the courts. 
5. That statutory provisions in fiscal legislation providing for the refund of overpayments 
of tax do not exclude common law remedies available to the taxpayer. 
6. That, while a general enrichment action has not as yet been recognized in our law, 
important steps have been taken towards achieving this goal-
* our Appellate Division has recognized that money paid in error of law is 
recoverable only if such mistake is 'excusable in the circumstances of the particular 
case.' 
* our Appellate Division has acknowledged that the Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue , as the public official entrusted with the administration of fiscal 
legislation, and since he derived his authority from the statute itself, it followed 
that if his reading of it should prove to be wrong he would not be empowered to 
retain, and hence would be obliged to refund, what was wrongly paid to him. 
* the Commissioner for Inland Revenue, a public official, bound as he is by 
statute, would have no statutory justification to retain what he should never have 
claimed. 
7. That where the Revenue has made an unlawful demand for tax, and the taxpayer is 
convinced that the demand is unlawful, he may well decide to pay first, asserting that he 
will challenge the lawfulness of the demand in litigation. 
8. That in the case of any tax or duty paid by the citizen pursuant to an unlawful demand, 
common sense seems to require that tax to be repaid unless special circumstances or some 
principle of policy require otherwise; prima facie the taxpayer should be entitled to 
repayment as of right. 
9. That the retention by the state of taxes unlawfully exacted is particularly obnoxious-
taxes should not be levied without the authority of Parliament and full effect can only be 
given to that principle if the return of taxes exacted under an unlawful demand can be 
enforced as a matter of right.When the Revenue makes a demand for tax that demand is 
implicitly backed by the coercive powers of the state and may well entail unpleasant 
economic and social consequences if the taxpayer does not pay. 
10. The Revenue is not entitled to lawfully retain sums unlawfully raised as this would 
conflict with, inter alia, Parliament's monopoly of taxation. 
11. If the Revenue cannot.retain the money, the taxpayer would have to establish either 
duress, mistake of fact or mistake of law to recover the money. 
12. The common law does NOT provide a general right to recover payments where the 
recipient would otherwise be unjustly enriched. 
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13. In England the 'Woolwich Principle' has recognized that money paid by a citizen to a 
public authority in the form of taxes or other levies paid pursuant to an ultra vires 
demand ... is prima facie recoverable ... as of right. 
14. The House of Lords went even further, obiter, to hold that such a principle should 
apply equally where tax or another levy has been exacted as a result of an intra vires but 
excessive or erroneous demand. 
15. Their Lordships in the Woolwich case have given notice (particularly Lords Goff and 
Slynn) that they do not regard the private law concept of duress or compulsion as fixed, so 
that it may, for example, extend to encompass what may be portrayed as 'deemed or 
presumed duress' by a public body of a citizen, in circumstances in which the public body 
has a number of statutory remedies open to it should the citizen fail to pay as 
demanded.This is a concept drawn from the United States, particularly the judgment of Mr 
Justice Holmes in Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co v O'Connor(l912)223 US 280 
and developed in Australia in Mason v New South Wales(l959)102 CLR 108 but which 
has not hitherto been recognised in English law. 
16. All five Law Lords in the Woolwich case cast considerable doubt on the validity and 
utility of the 'mistake of law' rule.In particular, the majority here declared that it should 
not apply to situations otherwise falling within the ambit of the Woolwich principle.This is 
because, under that principle, recovery is grounded in the unlawfulness of the demand and 
not in any mistaken belief of the payer.The whole status of this 'rule' is currently being 
considered by the Law Commission and the second Woolwich case certainly moves it 
further towards elimination. 
17. In the Woolwich case the House of Lords emphasised its willingness, in appropriate 
cases, to reconsider long-established lines of authority so as to give effect to important 
underlying principles.Such development of the law by reference to justice and principle 
rather than precedent provides an example of the House operating at its best.This 
statement is equally applicable to our Appellate Division which has also based its 
decisions in the First National Bank case and the Willis Faber Enthoven case on justice 
and principle, opening new avenues to the taxpayer and strengthening his rights in relation 
to those of the fiscus. 
18. The statutory provisions which appear in most areas of the tax code to regulate the 
repayment of tax by the Inland Revenue had no application in the circumstances of the 
Woolwich case as they are concerned with overpayment of tax pursuant to intra vires 
errors, such as excessive assessment.They are not material to a case of an ultra vires 
demand, that is, the case where there is simply no legal foundation for the demand at all. 
19. It was recently underlined in the case of Namex(Pty)Ltd v CIR 1992(2)SA 76l(C) 54 
SATC 307 that it was a long and firmly established principle of our law that public 
officials entrusted with the duty of collecting taxes cannot forego the taxes due to the 
State nor any part of them.The court stated that the Commissioner was required by the 
Income Tax Act to administer its provisions and to collect taxes.His rights and duties 
under the Act cannot be 'transferred' to another.He must carry out his duties as required 
by the Income Tax Act either personally or through officers under his control.Moreover, 
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the claim of the Commissioner for income tax cannot be ceded.He is, in relation to all 
matters of tax, akin to a delectus persona and he may not dispose of his rights or his 
duties.The rights and duties of a local authority to collect rate~ and taxes have similarly 
been held not to be capable of waiver or remission.Where the Legislature intends the 
Commissioner to have the power to remit moneys due to the State, the power to do so is 
expressly and specifically given.Thus, in terms of s 76 of the Income Tax Act the 
Commissioner may remit a penalty or allow payment by instalments.Nowhere in the 
Income Tax Act is the Commissiioner given a general power to reduce, waive, cede or 
otherwise alienate a claim for tax. 
Selikowitz J states at 321-2: 
'In the Cape Central Railways case it was held that our common law in many instances 
treated the State as it did a minor.In the Netherlands the rule was adopted and extended to 
the fiscus as the custodian of the public treasury.Thus, waivers, errors and even negligence 
in claiming taxes are not regarded as a bar to the defendant[the Commissioner] when he 
later seeks to carry out his duty to collect taxes.' 
20. In CIR v Delfos 1933 AD 242 it was said by Wessels CJ at 248 that: 
' It seems quite clear that the appellant[the Commissioner] has no choice in the matter.He· 
must assess according to the provisions of the Act.The principle that an officer appointed 
to carry out the provisions of a revenue Act cannot by contract remit taxation or moneys 
due to the Crown is clear .. .' 
21. It is submitted that the general rule that one cannot waive a statutory right which 
exists in no way contradicts the contention that the Commissioner has an obligation to 
refund taxes not due in terms of the relevant fiscal statute.In other words, the 
Commissioner's duty of collecting taxes and his obligation not to forego taxes due to the 
State in no way prevents him from refunding overpayments of tax where there is clearly 
no obligation to pay the tax in question on the part of the taxpayer. 
22. By the same token, the Commissioner is not empowered to refund taxes. to a taxpayer 
in circumstances where he has no such power granted to him in terms of the Act.He 
cannot decide that it would be more equitable or not to remit taxes where the tax in 
question is clearly due in terms of the legislation.He cannot retrospectively release 
taxpayers from an obligation to pay a tax in terms of the Act unless he has been granted 
that power by Parliament. 
23. The Commissioner has NO inherent power to remit taxes.However, it is submitted that 
he cannot demand or retain taxes already paid for which there is no foundation in the 
enabling fiscal legislation.This is based on the principle that the revenue is not entitled to 
lawfully retain sums unlawfully raised as this would conflict with, inter alia, Parliament's 
monopoly of taxation. 
24. In the Woolwich Building Society case Lord Keith of Kinkel stated at 743-
'But it is not open to serious doubt that central Revenue departments have a similar 
discretionary power to make refunds of tax payments which were not legally due.Indeed, it 
is a power of that nature which the Revenue claim to have exercised in the present case, 
in the course of their general function of managing and administering the tax system.So if 
the Revenue had refused in the exercise of their discretion to make the repayment they did 
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in the present case I am of opinion that in the absence of any other remedy it would have 
been open to Woolwich to claim repayment in proceedings for judicial review, and there 
would appear to be no reason why such proceedings would not have been successful.' 
25. However, the problem that faced the Woolwich Building Society was that Inland 
Revenue had accepted only a moral obligation to repay the principal amount of 57 million 
pounds, together with interest from the date of first judgment in the Woolwich's favour, 
which had been in the High Court in 1987.However, the Revenue claimed that any such 
repayment would be a matter of administrative grace only and not of legal entitlement, 
with the result that no interest was due for the period between the original payment and 
the date· of that High Court judgment.The effect of the Revenue's argument would have 
been that it was rewarded for its own unlawful behaviour with what Mr Justice Nolan 
described in the High Court as 'a very large, interest-free loan.The Woolwich could-only 
recover the interest in question- later agreed to be some 6.7 million pounds- if it could 
show that it had been entitled in law to repayment of the principal sums as from the dates 
of their first payment. 
26. An important decision of our Appellate Division, Administrator, Transvaal, and Others 
v Traub and Others 1989(4)SA 73l(A) approves the principle of 'legitimate expectation' in 
the context of our law.An aspect of the change in the scope of judicial review in England 
was the evolution of the legitimate expectation principle and it was evolved in the social 
context of the age in order to make the grounds of interference with the decisions of 
public authorities which adversely affect individuals co-extensive with notions of what is 
fair and what is not fair in the particular circumstances of the case.It has also been found 
necessary, or at any rate desirable, to extend the scope of judicial review to include cases 
of legitimate expectation in Australia and New Zealand and Corbett CJ was of the view 
that there was a similar need in this country. 
27. There are many cases which one can visualise in this sphere where an adherence to the 
formula of 'liberty, property and existing rights' would fail to provide a legal remedy when 
the facts cry out for one; and would result in a decision which appeared to have been 
arrived at by a procedure which was clearly unfair being immune from review.The law 
should in such cases be made to reach out and come to the aid of persons prejudicially 
affected.At the same time, whereas the concepts of liberty, property and existing rights are 
reasonably well defined, that of legitimate expectation is not.Like public policy, unless 
carefully handled it could become an unruly horse. 
28. The courts, in determining where the doctrine of legitimate expectation applies, will 
have to bear in mind the need from time to time to apply the curb.A reasonable balance 
must be maintained between the need to protect the individual from decisions unfairly 
arrived at by a public authority and the contrary desirability of avoiding undue judicial 
interference in their administration. 
29. A consideration of the taxpayer's legitimate expectations in the context of 
overpayments of tax- whether unlawful or through error- must be viewed in terms of some 
substantive benefit or advantage or privilege which the taxpayer concerned could 
reasonably expect to acquire or retain and which it would be unfair to deny such person 
without prior consultation or a prior hearing and, at other times, in terms of a legitimate 
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expectation to be accorded a hearing before some decision adverse to the taxpayer 
concerned is taken.Thus, the taxpayer concerned may have a legitimate expectation that 
the decision by the public authority will be favourable, or at least that before an adverse 
decision is taken he will be given a fair hearing. 
30. A frequently recurring theme in English cases concerning legitimate expectation is the 
duty on the part of the decision-maker(ie the Commissioner) to · act fairly'.This is simply 
another and preferable way of saying that the decision-maker must observe the principles 
of natural justice.Many features will come into play including the nature of the decision 
and the relationship of those involved before the decision was taken and a relevant factor 
might be the observance by the decision-maker in the past of some established procedure 
or practice.It is in this context that the existence of a legitimate expectation may impose 
on the decision-maker a duty to hear the person affected by his decision as part of his 
obligation to act fairly. 
31. In South Africa in recent years there have been a number of cases in Provincial 
Divisions in which the traditional scope of the principles relating to the observance of 
natural justice has been extended to decisions affecting a person who has no existing right, 
but merely a legitimate expectation. 
32. It is submitted that a taxpayer, dependent on the Commissioner's discretion in all 
aspects of overpayments of tax, could greatly benefit by the application of the doctrine of 
legitimate expectation when dealing with the Commissioner in the sense that he has a 
legitimate expectation that he will be afforded a fair hearing preliminary to the tax in 
question being refunded. He could legitimately expect overpaid tax to be refunded. 
33. In conclusion, it may be noted, that the underlying message of this thesis is that the 
taxpayer is in an unenviable position vis a vis the Commissioner when claiming refunds of 
tax overpaid. 
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